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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, Benjamin David Rettig (Rettig), hereby presents this replacement brief in 
response to this C.Ourt's 26 Februaiy2016 Order seeking re-briefing of this matter. 
JURISDICTION 
Rettig appeals from a conviction and sentence for aggravated murder and aggravated 
kidnapping, first degree felonies. 1his C.Ourt has appellate jurisdiction over convictions for 
such crimes. Utah C.Ode § 78A-3-102(3)(~. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: 
Whether Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2) unconstitutionally bars Rettig from appealing his 
conviction. 
In part, this issue includes the below-listed questions propounded by this C.Ourt in its 
26 Februaiy2016 Order. 
1. Does the "right to appeal in all cases" under article 1 § 12 of the Utah 
C.Onstitution, as originally understood at the time of the framing and as properly interpreted 
today, render the plea withdrawal statute, Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(c) unconstitutional? Of 
particular relevance to this question, among other things, are the following subsidiary issues: 
a. Does the right to appeal under article 1 §12 require that a waiver of 
that right given as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel be subject to challenge 
in an appellate proceeding in which the defendant retains the constitutional right to 
counsel? 
1 
b. Is the right to appeal under article 1 § 12 satisfied by a challenge under 
the Post C.Onviction Remedies Act, in which there is no right to effective assistance 
of counsel? 
2. What is the impact of the legislature's power to regulate jurisdiction of the 
courts under article 8 §§ 3 and 5 on the constitutionality of the plea withdrawal statute under 
article 1 § 12? 
3. Has this C.Ourt previously resolved the foregoing questions as a matter of stare 
decisis? 
4. If Mr. Rettig establishes that his constitutional right to appeal was denied by 
the plea withdrawal statute, and that his right to effective assistance of counsel was denied, 
what is the appropriate procedural remedy? 
Standard of Review. "C.Onstitutional issues .. . are questions of law that [Utah's 
appellate courts] review for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 Uf 82,125, 100 PJd 1177. 
"Whether appellate jurisdiction exists js a question of law [ this C.Ourt reviews] for 
correctness, giving no deference to the decision below." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999Uf54,116, 
982 P.2d 572. 
Preservation. This issue was not raised below, but "[t]he general rule that 
constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to when a 
person's liberty is at stake." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). Alternatively, 
the issue is not subject to the preservation rule given the fact that it pertains to the question 
of appellate jurisdiction, which is not properly addressed by the district court or, 
alternatively, the exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule should apply 
2 
to warrant appellate review of this issue. "[1]he exceptional circumstances exception is ill-
defined and applies primarilyto rare procedural anomalies." State v. Holgate, 200UT74,112, 
10 P Jd 346. 1his issue cannot be adequately addressed in any forum absent the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. It cannot properly be preserved below because the issue is an 
appellate jurisdictional question, or a question that a trial court need never answer to fulfill 
its proper functions. If the questions implicated by this issue are not decided in Rettig's 
favor, the Utah right to appeal in all cases and the federal Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel will remain rights without an effective remedy in Utah . 
. Issue 2: 
Whether Rettig's defense counsel was ineffective in either or both of the following 
lilStances: 
First, when counsel instructed Rettig to enter a guilty plea to aggravated murder on 
an accomplice liability theory, where counsel had not adequately informed Rettig of the 
applicable law, where counsel had not provided Rettig with requested discovery materials 
before Rettig pled guilty, where counsel did not abide by Rettig's decision on the plea offer, 
and where counsel instructed Rettig to mislead the district court during plea entry. 
Second, when counsel instructed Rettig to withdraw his Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea before the district court ruled on the motion, where the motion was based on Rettig's 
argument that his prior counsel was ineffective at the time he entered his plea. 
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 16, 89 PJd 162. 
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Preservation. 1his issue was not specifically preserved below. But, ineffective 
assistance of counsel may be reviewed for the first time on appeal See id. 
Issue 3: 
Whether the district court erred when it accepted Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated 
murder where the supporting factual basis did not show that Rettig intended to help Bond 
kill Mortensen. 
1. Standard of Review. "[W]hether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 {Utah 1996). The sufficiency 
of the factual basis of a plea is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Beckstead, 
2006 UT 42, 1 13, 140 PJd 1288. 
2. Preservation. This issue was not raised below, but "[t]he general rule that 
constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to when a 
person's liberty is at stake." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1983). Alternatively, 
Rettig requests plain error review. See State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55,122,309 P.3d 230. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES 
The following provisions are set forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief: 
U.S. Omst. Amend. VI. 
Utah Const. Art. I § 12. 
Utah Const. Art. VIII §§ 3-5. 
Utah Code§ 77-13-6. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Rettig appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated 
murder and aggravated kidnapping. 
Rettig challenges the constitutionality of Utah C.ode § 77-13-6(2) ( c), which bars any 
challenge to a guilty plea not made prior to sentencing. Challenging his guilty plea, Rettig 
asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the district court erred by 
accepting as sufficient the factual basis supporting his guilty plea. 
II. Proceedings & Disposition 
In December 2010, the State charged Rettig with aggravated murder, a capital 
offense, and a number of felonies. Rettig signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea in June 2011. R62-55. The State amended its information, and charged Rettig 
with one count each of aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping, first degree felonies. 
R54-53. On June 2, 2011, Rettig entered guilty pleas to those crimes. R410. 
On July 15, 2011, Rettig filed an ex parte letter with the district court, asking the 
court for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. Rl 15-14. Rettig's original counsel was replaced. 
R132-31. In December 2011, replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's motion to withdraw his 
pleas. R142. 
Thereafter, the district court gave Rettig concurrent sentences: an indeterminate term 
of 25 years to life on the aggravated murder charge and an indeterminate term of 15 years to 
life on the aggravated kidnapping charge. R192-91,411:30. The district court recommended a 
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fine of $10,000 on each count and restitution of $10,671.71 jointly and severallywith the co-
defendant. Jd. The district court recommended the privilege of parole for Rettig. Id. 
InJanuaiy2012, Rettig's replacement counsel withdrew. R198-96. Thereafter, on 
January 17, 2012, replacement counsel filed a Notice of Appeal via fax. R200-199. The 
original was filed on January 19, 2012. R202-01. Rettig's first appeal failed for untimeliness. 
R224-22. 
Rettig filed a prose Motion to Reinstate Appeal Rights on April 11, 2013. R247-31. 
Ultimately, on October 28, 2013, the district court granted the motion. R396-90. Rettig 
timely filed his new Notice of Appeal, for this appeal, on October 30, 2013. R402-400. 
In this C.Ourt, Rettig filed a Rule 23B Motion on February 26, 2014. He filed his 
opening brief on May 5, 2014. The State filed its brief and opposition to Rettig's Rule 23B 
motion on July 29, 2014. Rettig filed his reply brief on September 3, 2014. Subsequently, on 
February 26, 2016, this C.Ourt entered an order requesting that the parties re-brief the case 
and address specific questions .in addition to any other issues raised. 
III. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Facts Appearing on the Record 
In November 2009, Kay Mortensen was found dead in his home with multiple throat 
lacerations. R2. In June 2011, Rettig entered pleas of guiltyto aggravated murder and 
aggravated kidnapping. R410. The Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (the 
Statement) reads1 as follows: 
1 The State's attorney set forth the Statement orallyto the district court, albeit not strictly 
verbatim. R410:29-31. 
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On or about November 16, 2009, Martin Bond ("Bond") and I traveled in 
Bond's vehicle from Vernal, Utah to Kay Mortensen's ("Mortensen") home in 
Spanish Fork, Utah. The pmpose in traveling to Mortensen's home was ~o 
steal firearms located in Mortensen's home. Upon arriving at Mortensen's 
home, Bond indicated he would initially enter the home and then I was to 
follow him and also enter the home. Bond and I entered the home without 
being invited and we had a handgun with us. Bond placed zip ties on 
Mortensen and both of us were wearing ski masks and latex gloves in order to 
hide our identities. We commanded Mortensen to show us where his firearms 
were located. Monensen took us to a bunker located behind his home and we 
observed several weapons. We took Mortensen from the bunker and back into 
his home. After re-entering the home, we took Monensen upstairs to a 
bathroom. Bond told Mortensen to kneel down in front of the bathtub with 
his back to us. While Monensen was kneeling down, I was holding Monensen 
at gunpoint with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a knife from his person and 
then placed the knife back in his pocket. At this point, Bond left the 
bathroom, went downstairs and returned with a black-handled knife 
approximately 10 to 12 inches in length. Upon returning, I observed Bond 
take the knife and slice Mortensen's throat. I am not cenain how many times 
Bond cut Mortensen's throat. After cutting his throat, I observed Bond stab 
Mortensen in the base of his neck with the same knife. 
Shortly after Bond cut and stabbed Mortensen, we heard someone knock on 
the front door. I ran downstairs and hid behind the front door and Bond 
opened the door. A female and male were at the door asking for Mortensen. (I 
later discovered that the individuals were Pamela and Roger Mortensen.) I was 
still holding the handgun when Pamela and Roger entered the home. I 
informed Pamela and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs and that he was 
okay. We told them to walk into the sunken living room and we placed zip ties 
on Pamela's and Roger's hands and feet. At some point, Bond came out of the 
kitchen with another knife which I believed he was going to use to kill Pamela 
and Roger. I stepped in front of Bond and told him not kill Pamela and Roger. 
While Pamela and Roger were tied up in the living room, I remained in the 
living room with them holding the handgun while Bond removed 
approximately 25 of Mortensen's weapons (including handguns and rifles) 
from the bunker and placed them in Bond's vehicle. We also took ammunition 
from the bunker. After placing the guns and ammunition in Bond's vehicle, 
we took Roger's driver's license and told him and Pamela that they needed to 
tell the police that three black men had tied them up and if they told the police 
a different story, we knew where they lived and we would come back and kill 
them. We left Mortensen's residence and drove back to Vernal. On our way 
back to Vernal, we stopped at a rest stop and discarded our gloves in a 
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dumpster. In Vernal, Bond and I went up a canyon and buried the weapons. 
Following this, Bond took my hoodie and shoes in order to dispose of them. 
R60-59. 
Rettig admitted to having a firearm and being present while Bond committed the 
murder. R410:29-31. Preparing for sentence, Rettig wrote that he participated because he 
feared for his own life and had been threatened by Bond. Rl 47-46. 
With intent to withdraw his guilty plea and replace his counsel, Rettig filed a letter 
with the district court. RllS-13. Rettig complained his attorneys had not asked him for a 
complete version of the events, had not provided him discovery prior to his plea despite 
multiple requests, had not received information Rettig gave the attorneys' investigator, and 
ignored Rettig's protests to the Statement. Rl 15. Rettig further claimed he had felt pressured 
to admit a false version of events. R114. 
Rettig's replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's request to withdraw the guilty plea, 
explaining that Rettig was really looking for information and that he had resolved the issues. 
See R411:24-25. 
Various persons testified at the sentencing hearing on behalf of both Rettig and 
Mortensen, and others submitted letters on Rettig's behalf. See general!J R411, R179-48. The 
prosecution recommended that the sentences run concurrently as part of the plea agreement. 
R411:20. The plea was offered in part bythe prosecution because "Mr. Rettig did agree to 
assist us in the prosecution of Mr. Bond... We also- we felt very strongly all along that Mr. 
Bond was actuallythe one who, who actually committed the murder." R411:21. The district 
court aclmowledged that once Rettig's involvement was discovered "[he] did show complete 
cooperation" and that Rettig was "taking the responsibility that [he] failed to take two years 
8 
ago." R411:29-30. As noted supra, the district court sentenced Rettig to serve time in prison. 
R411:30. 
Facts to be Developed on Remand Under Rule 23B 
Rettig filed with this Court a Rule 23B Motion for Remand on February 26, 2014, 
supported by affidavit, alleging facts which do not yet appear on the record and will be 
developed at remand if granted. Decision on the Motion for Remand has been deferred. The 
following facts, not yet appearing on the record, are necessaryto Appellant's argument. 
During the plea negotiation phase, Rettig was represented by three attorneys: Michael 
Esplin as lead attorney, with Stephen Frazier and Anne Boyle as assisting attorneys. Esplin, 
Frazier, and Boyle never explained to Rettig Utah's laws regarding accomplice liability or the 
element the State would need to prove to convict on an accomplice theory at trial. 
When meeting with his attorneys, Rettig met primarily with Frazier and Boyle, with 
about fifteen total visits between the two of them. Rettig met with Esplin about five times. 
Most visits were under 30 minutes in duration. Rettig asked all three of his attorneys multiple 
times during visits for a copy of the discovery that they had received from the State. Rettig 
was not provided any discovery from his attorneys until after his guilty pleas had been 
entered. 
During Rettig's third meeting with Esplin, Esplin presented to Rettig an offer 
..J received from the State, which was a recommended sentence of Life without the possibility 
of parole if Rettig would plead guilty to the Aggravated Murder charge. Esplin inf onned 
Rettig that was a "bad deal" and that he was confident he would be able to get Rettig a 
sentence of seven to ten years instead. Rettig asked if a change in venue would help the case. 
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Esplin said that a change in venue would be fruitless because any venue in Utah would be 
biased against him. Esplin told Rettig that Rettig would have to serve time in prison. Esplin ~ 
told Rettig that Rettig was guilty because Rettig was present when Bond killed Mortensen. 
During a subsequent meeting with Frazier, Rettig was told again that the attorneys were 
pushing for a seven- to ten-year deal, and reiterated that they believed Rettig was guilty 
because Rettig was present. 
During Rettig's fourth meeting with Esplin, Esplin presented a new offer from the 
State, which was an agreed sentencing recommendation of 25 years to Life. Esplin seemed 
happy with the offer. Rettig rejected the offer. Esplin told Rettig that he would speak with 
the prosecution about the off er, but that Rettig should not be firm to decline the off er. 
Rettig noticed a change in his attorneys' attitudes toward him and his case after the 25-to-
Life offer was made. His attorneys told him that it was the best deal he was going to get. 
Rettig's familywas called to a meeting with Rettig's attorneys. During that meeting, 
the attorneys disclosed confidential information regarding Rettig's case to Rettig's family, 
without Rettig's authorization. Rettig's attorneys asked Rettig's familyto convince Rettig to 
accept the 25-to-Lif e off er. 
Rettig decided to plead guilty because his attorneys told him he was guilty and that 
the 25-to-Life offer was the best deal he was going to get. Rettig felt pressured by his 
attorneys and his family to accept the off er. 
Rettig' s attorneys met with Rettig to discuss the plea deal and the charges to which 
Rettig would be pleading. They showed Rettig a copy of the factual statement that would be 
the basis of Rettig' s plea. Rettig told his attorneys that the factual statement was untrue and 
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that he wanted to re-write it. Rettig's attorneys said Rettig could re-write the statement. 
~ Rettig's attorneys met with Rettig about one week prior to his entry of the plea. Rettig gave 
his attorneys the rewritten factual statement. Rettig's attorneys said theywould take the 
statement to the prosecution to discuss and negotiate the content of the factual statement. 
Esplin and Frazier met with Rettig in the holding cell of the courthouse on the date 
of his entry of plea. They showed Rettig the plea statement. The factual statement had not 
been changed. Rettig asked his attorneys whythe statement had not been changed. Rettig's 
attorneys told him that the statement had not been discussed or negotiated with the 
prosecution. Theytold Rettig that the content of the statement does not matter. Theytold 
Rettig that because he was present when Bond killed Mortensen, he was guilty. Rettig 
expressed concern over the requirement in the plea agreement that Rettig testify against 
Bond. Rettig' s attorneys told Rettig not to wony, that Rettig would not be asked to testify, 
and that "it's all just legal jargon anyways." Lastly Rettig's attorneys told Rettig that if the 
judge asks him a question about whether everything had been explained to him, whether he 
was satisfied with his attorneys, and whether he understood what was going on, that he 
should say, "Yes." 
After the court proceeding, Rettig had regrets about entering his plea after being 
pressured and coerced to lie to Judge Low. Rettig informed his counsel that he wanted to 
withdraw his plea. The next day, Frazier and Esplin met with Rettig. Rettig expressed his 
concerns regarding the plea process and the pressure to lie to the court. Esplin told Rettig 
that if he withdrew his plea, he would be given the death penalty. Rettig said he was not 
concerned with that and wanted to take his chances. Esplin then said that the death penalty 
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would not be given, but Life without parole would. Esplin was yelling at Rettig. Frazier sat 
quietly during the meeting. Rettig told them again that he wanted to withdraw his plea and 
that he wanted his discovery. Rettig then terminated the visit. 
A few days later, Boyle met with Rettig and gave him the discovery. Boyle told Rettig 
to write a letter to Judge Low if he wanted to withdraw his plea. Rettig wrote the letter to 
Judge Low asking to withdraw his plea, which appears at R115-14. At the next court hearing, 
Esplin and Frazier asked to withdraw. ~ 
Aaron Dodd was appointed as Rettig's new counsel to handle the motion to 
withdraw his plea. Rettig met with Dodd about three times. Rettig informed Dodd about the 
allegations in the case. In Dodd's opinion, Rettig was not guilty of aggravated murder. Dodd 
told Rettig that he could get Rettig' s plea withdrawn. At the next court hearing, Rettig was 
surprised to learn that Aaron Dodd was no longer his attorney, and that he would now be 
represented by Dana Facemyer. 
About a month later, Facemyer visited with Rettig twice in custody. Facemyer said 
that he felt Rettig was guilty. Facemyer did not explain Utah's accomplice liability laws to 
Rettig. Facemyer said that if Rettig took the case to trial he would get the death penalty or 
life with parole. Rettig does not remember ever agreeing to not attempt to withdraw his plea. 
Rettig was emotionally distraught and confused during this process. No attorney adequately 
explained accomplice liability and other important issues to him. 
If Rettig had been properly advised regarding the law and his concerns with the plea 
agreement, and had Rettig been provided with the discovery that he had requested from his 
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attorneys, he would have chosen to reject the State's offer and would have exercised his right 
~ to a fair trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue 1: 
Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2) unconstitutionally bars Rettig's challenges to his guiltyplea 
on appeal. 
The statute unconstitutionally blocks Rettig's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
on appeal because the statute bars not only untimely challenges that otherwise comply with 
the statute, but also challenges that the plea is illegitimate under the Sixth Amendment. The 
Sixth Amendment provides a right to effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the plea 
withdrawal statute's existence or terms. This C.Ourt was presented this issue in "Rhinehart, but 
did not sufficiently address it. This C.Ourt should examine the issue more closely, particularly 
in light of U.S. Supreme C.Ourt opinions in Frye, Lafler, and Padilla. Those cases are examples 
of either ineffective assistance of counsel going beyond the !mowing or voluntary- standard 
Utah has focused on previously or of a federal court invalidating a guilty plea based on the 
Sixth Amendment. 
The statute also violates Utah's right to appeal, which exists in conjunction with the 
Utah constitutional right to open courts, due process, etc. Weaver declares that Utah's 
constitution grants an unqualified right of appeal. Rights demand enforcement through 
sufficient process, and state courts should enforce rights secured bythe U.S. C.Onstitution. 
The plea withdrawal statute blocks Rettig' s ability to assert his constitutional rights and other 
rights related to his plea not dependent on the legislature granting a right to withdraw pleas. 
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Cockerham unequivocally declares that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
plea bargaining should not be barred bythe plea bargain agreement itself. Moreover, Rettig's G;,, 
waiver should be construed as an acknowledgment that a guilty plea inherently cuts off 
certain appeal arguments. 
The PCRA is not a substitute for direct appellate review. Moreover, it is conceivable 
that if the PCRA is held to be a sufficient substitute, a defendant might never be represented 
by effective counsel either in the original or collateral proceedings. 
As to article VIII of the Utah C.Onstitution, the legislature mayspecifythe court of 
original jurisdiction and the court of appellate jurisdiction and also make provision for 
moving between the courts of original and appellate jurisdiction. However, as Article VIII 
emphasizes, there is an appeal in all cases not originating in the Utah Supreme C.Ourt. As per 
Johnson, appellate jurisdiction is to review a lower court's decision or judgment and reverse, 
modify, remand, etc. If Rettig' s federal constitutional rights related to his guilty plea were 
violated in the district court, this C.Ourt has jurisdiction to strike or vacate the guilty plea. 
Further this C.Ourt is given constitutional authority to promulgate rules. The legislature is 
given authorityto amend rules. The legislature has inappropriately promulgated a rule as to 
when defendants may move to withdraw guilty pleas. 
1his C.Ourt has not resolved whether the plea withdrawal statute violates the right to 
appeal. Rhinehart claims that Merrill resolved the issue, but the "right to appeal" is mentioned 
nowhere in Merrill. A resolution of one or many constitutional challenges, as in Merrill, does 
not resolve all possible constitutional challenges. 
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The appropriate remedy here is to vacate or strike the· guilty plea as illegitimate 
because it violated constitutional rights or was based on an insufficient factual basis. 
Alternatively, Rettig' s motion to withdraw his plea should be reinstated. 
Issue 2: 
Rettig' s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated in 
numerous respects, and his guilty plea should be stricken or vacated. (These arguments are 
based on facts Rettig intends to develop on Rule 23B remand. Rettig's 23B motion is 
pending.) 
C.Ounsel failed to adequately discuss the law of accomplice liability with Rettig, stating 
to Rettig that his mere presence at Mortensen's murder made him guilty. Mere presence at a 
crime does not automatically make a person guilty. 
C.Ounsel failed to fulfill the obligation of providing Rettig with the discovery 
information shared by the prosecution. Rettig was unable to evaluate his own case. 
Despite Rettig infonning counsel he intended to plead guilty, counsel pressured 
Rettig to plead guilty and unethically disclosed confidential inf onnation about the case to 
Rettig's family so that they could pressure him to plead guilty. C.Ounsel should have 
supported Rettig's decisions and should not have disclosed confidential information. 
C.Ounsel instructed Rettig to admit to a factual statement Rettig had disputed and 
asked counsel to have altered, to promise to testify against Bond despite having no such 
intention, and to mislead the district court in the plea colloquy. 
Absent the foregoing deficiencies, Rettig would have likely insisted on trial. The 
deficiencies can be considered on a cumulative basis. Rettig need only show a reasonable 
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probability that but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Indeed, Rettig 
attempted to withdraw the plea. The cumulative effect of the errors is to undennine 
confidence in the correctness of the outcome. 
As noted, Rettig attempted to withdraw his plea, but replacement counsel withdrew 
the motion. Rettig asserts that this, too, was ineffective assistance of counsel. Although 
Rettig contends this C.ourt should strike or vacate his plea as violating the U.S. Constitution, 
Rettig likelycould have prevailed on a motion to withdraw the plea pursuant to Utah's plea 
withdrawal statute. Many aspects of the previously mentioned claims to ineffective assistance 
of counsel relate to whether Rettig' s plea was knowing and voluntary. There is a reasonable 
likelihood the motion would have been granted. 
Issue 3: 
The district court erred by accepting Rettig' s guilty plea because it was based on an 
insufficient factual basis. 
Utah R Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B) requires a guilty plea to be accompanied bya sufficient 
factual basis. Admittedly, Rule 11 is procedural, and for violation of it to be harmful, it must 
affect substantive rights. Alexander suggests that the only substantive right at issue in Rule 11 
is the right for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary. But, Alexander itself acknowledges 
that pleas must also be intelligent, as explained more completely in Breckenridge and also as 
explained in the advisorycommittee notes to the federal version of Rule 11, with which Utah 
intended Rule 11 to comport. The requirement of a sufficient factual basis relates to the right 
for the plea to be intelligent. Breckenridge acknowledges pleas can be knowing, voluntary, and 
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unintelligent. Moreover, it should be noted that the right to effective assistance of counsel 
stands regardless of whether there is a statutory- right to withdraw a plea. 
To be convicted of aggravated murder, a defendant must directly commit the offense 
or solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid the intentional or knowing 
death of another, including incident to acts, schemes, or course of conduct, or criminal 
episode. 
The question of whether the factual basis supported the guilty plea is a constitutional 
issue exempted from the preservation rule. Alternatively, it is plain error. Plain error requires 
a showing of obvious, hannful error. The requirement for obviousness can be dispensed 
with in appropriate cases. The error is hannful if it undermines confidence in the outcome 
reached below. 
The factual basis supporting Rettig' s guilty plea did not indicate Rettig acted with the 
mental state required for conviction of aggravated murder or otherwise solicited, requested, 
commanded, or encouraged Bond to kill Mortensen. The nearest allegation is that Rettig 
held Mortensen at gunpoint before Bond returned with a knife and Rettig observed as Bond 
killed Mortensen. There is no indication Rettig knew Bond was looking for a knife or what 
Bond intended to do. Indeed, once Rettig understood Bond's intent and capability, Rettig 
intervened to prevent Bond from killing anybody else. It was error to hold the factual basis 
as being sufficient. 
The insufficiency should have been clear to the district court. Alternatively, the 
obviousness requirement should be dispensed with to do justice. Had the district court 
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recognized the insufficiency of the factual basis, there is a reasonable probability it would not 
have accepted the guilty plea to aggravated murder. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah Code § 77-13-6(2) Unconstitutionally Bars Rettig's Appeal. 
Rettig hereby addresses the issues suggested by the Gm.rt in its order for re-briefing 
as well as others. 
A Utah C.ode § 77-13-6 unconstitutionally bars Rettig's abilit;yto assert his 
federal right to effective assistance of counsel. 
1. The right to effactive assistance of counsel 
Utah C.ode § 77-13-6(2) bars "[a]nychallenge to a guilty plea" not made "before 
sentence is announced" and allows withdrawal only if the plea was unknowing or 
involuntary-. Thus, the statute facially bars challenges not based on assertions that the guilty 
plea was unknowing or involuntary-, including claims that the guilty plea was based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoythe right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The right 
to counsel includes the right to effective counsel. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984). 
A criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel when being advised 
whether to enter a plea. See Hill v. l.,ockhart, 47 4 U.S. 52 {1985). This Court has previously 
been presented with the issue that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is independent 
of a claim that a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Utah Code § 77-
13-6(2). State v. Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114, 167 P.3d 1046. However, the issue was not 
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addressed directly in the C.Ourt's opinion. In this case, this C.Ourt should examine the issue 
~ more closely. The plea withdrawal statute provides an avenue to vindicate certain 
constitutional rights. But, constitutional rights can invalidate a guilty plea (or the overall 
conviction) regardless of whether the plea withdrawal statute exists. If a defendant claims 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the question is not whether he is entitled to withdraw his 
plea under a state statute or whether the state allows any pleas to be withdrawn. The 
question is whether the defendant's rights were violated. 
In the years since Rhinehart, the right to effective counsel during plea bargaining has 
been re-emphasized and even extended by the U.S. Supreme C.Ourt's decisions in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding as ineffective assistance failure to inform defendant of 
collateral risk of deportation), Missouri v. Frye, 123 S.Q. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 
S.Q. 1376 (2012).2 
In Lafler, the defendant asserted that counsel ineffectively advised him to reject a plea 
offer. Lafler, 132 S.Q. at 1383. Despite the state court holding the plea offer rejection 
!mowing and voluntary, the Supreme C.Ourt stated that "[a]n inquiry into whether the 
rejection of the plea is knowing and voluntary ... is not the correct means bywhich to 
address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1390.3 
In Frye, defense counsel did not inform the defendant of a plea off er, and the 
defendant pied guilty after the off er had expired and without a new offer. Frye, 123 S.Q. at 
2 See Frye, 132 S.Q. at 1413 (referencing "our newly created constitutional field of plea-
bargaining law'') (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3 This statement suggests that the !mowing and voluntary standard of Utah's plea withdrawal 
statute does not account for defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and in fact blocks 
assertion of those rights by barring any challenge not timely and not related to lmowledge or 
voluntariness. 
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1404. Analyzing its own opinion in Padilla, the Court stated that.it had "rejected the 
argument ... that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel." Id. at © 
1406. The Court then proceeded to explain that despite the abilityof plea colloquies to 
provide states protection from claims that a plea was based on inadequate counsel, "Hill and 
Padilla both illustrate that . . . there may be instances when claims of ineffective assistance 
can arise after the conviction is entered." Id. Moreover, the Court stated that in some 
situations in which an effective assistance claim arises, "the prosecution has little or no 
notice if something may be amiss and perhaps no capacity to intervene in any event." Id. at 
1407. The Court acknowledged as logical and somewhat persuasive Missouri's arguments 
that "it is unfair to subject [Missouri] to the consequences of defense counsel's 
inadequacies," even when the defendant retains the rights to a fair trial or subsequent guilty 
plea. Id. However, the Court emphasized, without criticism, the prevalence of plea 
bargaining and insisted that "criminal defendants require effective counsel during plea 
negotiations. 'Anything less ... might deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel 
at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."'" Id. at 1407-08 (citation 
omitted). 
2. Utah law unconstitutional/y hamstrings Rettigfrom pursuing a claim ofineffactive 
assistance of counsel on appeaL 
In light of the clarification provided by Padilla, Frye, and Lafler and their precedents, 
this Court should reconsider its Rhinehart ruling that§ 77-13-6 is a constitutional and 
jurisdictional bar to an appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Rettig asserts that he entered a guilty plea as a result of ineffective assistance of 
~ counsel. But, Rhinehart cuts off Rettig's ability to assert this claim on appeal. Rhinehart justifies 
this result in the following terms: 
The ineffectiveness of a defendant's counsel may take many forms and res~t 
in relieving a criminal defendant of an undesirable result. The ineffectiveness 
of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can spare a 
defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the 
same case required of eveiy defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea; that the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. 
Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114. The crux of Rhinehart's reasoning, in essence, is that the only 
ineffective assistance that matters in the plea context is the ineffectiveness that renders a plea 
unlmowing or involuntaiy. This conclusion is flatly refuted by Padilla, Frye, and Lafler. 
Ineffectiveness need not render a plea unlmowing or involuntary. In Lafler, the ineffective 
assistance led to a knowing and voluntary decision to go to trial. In Frye, the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty after a plea off er, of which counsel had not informed 
him, had expired. 
The practical effect of § 77-13-6(2) is to bar a defendant who pleads guilty to a crime 
from vindicating his right to assistance of counsel. The statute unconstitutionally insulates 
guilty plea convictions from appellate challenge. The legislature is free to determine whether 
and on what terms defendants maywithdraw guilty pleas. But, the legislature's requirements 
for guilty plea withdrawal should not be used to determine whether defendants may 
vindicate rights, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel, that exist independent of 
whether guilty plea withdrawal is permitted. Nor should the time limit to move to withdraw 
a plea be permitted to bar any challenge to the plea. 
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Perhaps this O:mrt has no jurisdiction to allow Rettig to withdraw his guilty plea 
under Utah's guilty plea withdrawal statute, but even so, this court should order Retting's 
plea stricken or vacated- if it cannot be withdrawn. If Rettig establishes that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court is obligated to recognize that Rettig' s plea is 
illegitimate under the U.S. Constitution, regardless of whether Utah's plea withdrawal statute 
recognizes the existence of constitutional rights not connected to whether a guilty plea was 
knowing or voluntary. 
B. The right to appeal in all cases under article I § 12 of the Utah C.onstitution 
renders Utah's plea withdrawal statute unconstitutional. 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right to appeal in all cases. 
Utah C.onst. Art. I § 12; see also Utah Code § 77-18a-1 (" A defendant may, as a matter of 
right, appeal from: ( a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea."). 
There is little drafting history regarding the right to appeal. But, other provisions 
correlate to allow appeal of Rettig's Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." Id. art. I § 7. Also, " [ a ]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him . . . shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without ... 
unnecessary delay. Id. art. I§ 11. And, "Except for matters filed originallywith the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a 
court with appellate jurisdiction over the case." Id. art. VIII, § 5 
In a case decided when the Utah Constitution was young, this C.ourt declared "the 
provisions of our state C.onstitution . . . gave the petitioners here an unqualijied right of appeal 
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regardless of the plea entered in the city court." Weaver v. Kimball, 202 P. 9, 10 (Utah 1921) 
..iJ ( emphasis added). 
Utah's plea withdrawal statute, in violation of Utah's constitution, blocks Rettig's 
ability to assert his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and any other 
right afforded him by federal or state constitutions, statutes, and rules of procedure. 
It is axiomatic that every right demands enforcement through sufficient process. See, 
e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 430 (1986) (O'C.Onner, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("If there is one fundamental requisite of due process, it is that an 
individual is entitled to an opportunityto be heard."); Fqy v. Noisa, 372 U.S. 391, 427 (1963) 
(stating that due process "comprehends not only the right to be heard but also a number of 
explicit procedural rights," that "due process denied in the proceedings leading to conviction 
is not restored just because the state court declines to adjudicate the claimed denial on the 
merits, and that "forfeiture of remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by 
which [a defendant's] conviction was procured"); Ex Parle Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908) 
("We must assume ... that the state courts will enforce every right secured by the 
C.Onstitution."). 
In Utah, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea. Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2). As creator 
of this statutory right, the legislature has set the conditions for exercise of this right, stating 
that only unknowing or involuntary guilty pleas may be withdrawn. Id. Undoubtedly, those 
conditions balance the interests of finality and certain constitutional rights. The problem 
arises where the statute bars any challenge to a guilty plea and where courts hold that they 
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cannot adjudicate any challenge related to the guilty plea that is either untimely, unrelated to 
whether the plea was knowing/ voluntary, or both. 
The terms of the statutorily created right to withdraw a guilty plea are now being used 
to determine whether courts have jurisdiction to vindicate other rights that exist 
independently of state statute. If Utah had no plea withdrawal statute, criminal defendants 
would still be able to complain that they were denied effective assistance of counsel or that 
their guilty pleas were unknowing, involuntary, and/ or tmintelligent. 4 
Utah's plea withdrawal statute is barring appeals that would be valid in the absence of 
the plea withdrawal statute and case law holding it to be jurisdictional. This implicates not 
onlythe right to appeal, but the closely connected rights to due process and open courts. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel demands enforcement through sufficient process. 
State courts must enforce rights secured bythe U.S. C.Onstitution. Utah defendants are 
guaranteed not only access to Utah courts to assert their rights (including federal rights) but 
also that remedies should be administered without unnecessary delay. 
The U.S. C.Onstitution guarantees effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining 
stage. The U.S. C.Onstitution requires pleas to be !mowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The 
Utah C.Onstitution guarantees a right to appeal. The Utah C.Onstitution guarantees due 
process and open courts to assert constitutional and other rights, whether granted byfederal 
or state constitutions or laws. A plea withdrawal statute should not be interpreted to bar the 
exercise or vindication of constitutional rights or the vindication of independently existing 
rights it did not create. 
4 The federal right that guilty pleas need be intelligent is discussed in Part III, infra. 
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Even if Rettig does not qualify for withdrawal of his plea under the withdrawal 
statute, he is entitled to argue that the ultimate conviction was unconstitutional. This Court 
should consider the merits of Rettig's claims. On the merits, Rettig's guilty plea should be 
stricken or vacated, even if not "withdrawn" in accordance with the plea withdrawal statute. 
1. 
Yes. 
Does the right to appeal under article 1 § 12 require that a waiver of that right 
given as a result of ineffactive assistance of counsel be subject to challenge in an 
appellate proceeding in which the defendant retains the constitutional right to 
counsel? 
[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the 
negotiation of a plea agreement cannot be barred by the agreement itself. It is 
altogether inconceivable to hold such a waiver enforceable when it would 
deprive a defendant of the opportunity to assert his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel where he had accepted the waiver in reliance on delinquent 
representation. 
United States v. Cockerham, 237 FJd 1179, 1184 (10th Gr. 2001) (internal quotations omitted) 
(holding that a waiver of a right to collaterally attack a guilty plea cannot be effective where 
the collateral attack is based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea negotiation 
phase). 
If the waiver is given as a result of ineffective assistance of counseL5 it is invalid 
under the federal constitution, and both the state and federal constitutions require that the 
defendant be given due process to request a remedy. 
Rettig signed the Statement in support of his guilty pleas. R62-55. The Statement 
indicated, "[b ]y pleading guilty, I understand my right to appeal is limited. I understand that I 
5 There is an inherent problem with an attorney advising a client not onlyto plead guilty, but 
..J additional!J to waive some of the appeal rights that have not been obliterated by the logical 
implications of a guilty plea. Moreover, advising a client to waive an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for appeal would pose a conflict for the potentially ineffective counsel. 
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am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to 
appeal my sentence, I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered." R58. The next paragraph stated, "I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I 
am waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional.rights explained above." Id. 
Rettig' s signed statement regarding his appellate rights should be interpreted as 
reflecting an understanding that under Utah law, appeal options are limited after a guilty plea 
has been entered, rather than a voluntary waiver of Rettig' s constitutional appeal rights after 
entry of a guilty plea. Even if the signed statement is an explicit waiver of appeal rights, it 
cannot be effective against an appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
the plea bargaining phase. 
2. Is the right to appeal under article I§ 12 satisfied by a challenge under the Post 
Conviction Remedies Act, in which there is no right to effettt"ve assistance of counsel? 
"A petition for post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus, collaterally attacks a 
conviction and/ or a sentence. It is not a substitute for direct appellate review." Gardner v. 
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994). It is a civil, district court procedure where an indigent 
defendant generally begins the process unrepresented and has no right to counsel. Utah 
Cbde § 78B-9-109. 
Moreover, the right to appeal is tied to vindication of other rights, such as the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. If a defendant is denied ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage and barred from asserting as much on 
direct appeal, he must resort to the PCRA, which guarantees no counsel. Ultimately, under a 
system that forces defendants to claim ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA, a 
defendant denied effective assistance of counsel might never receive or vindicate his right to 
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effective assistance of counsel. As discussed supra, even a defendant entering a guiltyplea is 
guaranteed the right of effective assistance of counsel. 
C The legislature's power to regulate jurisdiction of the courts under article VIII 
§§ 3 and 5 does not legitimize the plea withdrawal statute's attempt to block 
any challenge to a guilty plea, and the plea withdrawal statute's deadline to 
bring a motion to withdraw a plea infringes on this C.Ourt's power under 
article VIII§ 4. 
Section 3 of article VIII grants this C.Ourt appellate jurisdiction. Section 5 of article 
VIII unambiguously states that there is an appeal of right in all cases from a "court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction". "Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme C.Ourt, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the 
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the case." Utah C.Onst. 
art. VIII,§ 5. "The Supreme C.Ourt shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in 
the courts of the state ... " Id. art. VIII,§ 4. With a two-thirds vote, the "Legislature may 
amend the Rules of Procedure." Id. (emphasis added).6 
"Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the decision or judgment of an 
inferior tribunal, upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify 
such decision; judgment, or decree." State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1941). 
"There being no constitutional inhibitions, the legislature may define and prescribe the 
forum in which actions may or must be commenced, and the procedure necessary-to pass 
._; from one court to another. Id. at 1039 (performing analysis on the question of whether a 
prosecution should have been initiated in district or city court). 
6 The plea withdrawal statute passed with two-thirds vote. 
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The plea withdrawal statute blocks "any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the 
time period specified" and further provides that only unlmowing and involuntary guilty pleas 
may be withdrawn. Utah C.Ode § 77-13-6(2). Under this statute, a defendant cannot assert on 
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. Stale v. 
Rhinehart, 2007UT61,114, 167 P.3d 1046. 
As explained in Johnson, a court with appellate jurisdiction is to review the decision or 
judgment of the lower tribunal and affirm, reverse, modify, etc. This means that all litigants 
are entitled to have a higher court review the decision of a lower court and to have the 
higher court fix mistakes made by the lower court. As further explained in Johnson, the 
legislature's role is to specify the court of original jurisdiction (within constitutional bounds) 
and provide rules for how to get from the court of original jurisdiction to the court of 
appellate jurisdiction. The legislature should not be able to specifywhat portions of the 
proceedings below may be reviewed. The right of appeal is unqualified. Weaver v. Kimball, 202 
P. 9, 10 (Utah 1921) 
Thus, the legislature is not entitled to bar any challenge to a guilty plea as it has 
attempted to do in the plea withdrawal statute. A defendant is entitled to appeal and have a 
higher court review the decision. If the appellant asserts that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his plea, the appellate court should review whether the statutorily-created right to 
withdraw a plea may be invoked or whether it is too late to withdraw or whether the district 
court erred in refusing leave to withdraw. If the appellant asserts his plea violated rights 
granted by the federal constitution, the appellate court should review whether that is true 
and strike the plea as unconstitutional if the court finds a violation. 
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Section 4, article VIII, grants this C.ourt authorityto adopt the rules of procedure to 
be used in this state. For example, U.RC.P. 59 sets the deadline to move for a new trial in 
certain cases. Utah's plea withdrawal statute specifies that a motion to withdraw a plea must 
be made before sentence is announced. Tlus is a deadline similar to other procedural 
deadlines. However, it has been promulgated by the legislature instead of this C.ourt. The 
legislature has exceeded its bounds. The legislature mayonlyamend rules. Here, it has 
promulgated a rule. 
Sections 3-5 of article VIII of the Utah C.Onstitution do not justifythe legislature's 
use of the plea withdrawal statute to block the ability of this C.ourt to review whether the 
lower court honored a defendant's rights, whether they be statutory or constitutional. 
D. This C.Ourt has not resolved the foregoing questions as a matter of stare 
decisis. 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that a court may depart from precedent if it 
was erroneous or conditions have changed. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,399 (Utah 1994). 
Presumably, changing conditions include U.S. Supreme C.Ourt opinions cutting against a state 
court's precedents.7 
A nwnber of Utah cases address various versions of the plea withdrawal statute. But 
as to analysis of whether the current version violates the right to appeal or is justified by the 
legislature's regulatory power, case law is sparse. 
In State v. Menill, 2005 UT 34, 1121-47, 114 P.3d 585, this C.Ourt addressed a nwnber 
of constitutional challenges to "imposition of" a "finite period to bring a motion to 
7 To the extent any precedent blocks the relief sought herein, Rettig requests that this C.ourt 
overrule that precedent as erroneous from the beginning or now operating under new 
federal case law. 
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withdraw a guilty plea." This C.ourt ruled that the plea withdrawal statute does not violate 
constitutional provisions regarding open courts, separation of powers, due process, equal 
protection, or uniform application of laws. Id. This C.ourt did not directly address the right to 
appeal or grapple with whether a state plea withdrawal statute can affect a Sixth Amendment 
challenge to the legitimacy of a conviction. 
In State v. Rhinehart, 2007UT61,111, 167 P.3d 1046, the defendant asserted that she 
was unconstitutionally deprived of her right to appeal. In response, this C.ourt invoked 
Merrill, stating that the statute was "constitutional." Id. 112. However, the phrase "right to 
appeal" is found nowhere in the Mem·ll opinion. The Rhinehart defendant raised the right to 
appeal, but this C.ourt did not meaningfully address the assertion thereof. 
E. If Mr. Rettig prevails on his ar_guments regarding the constitutionality of the 
plea withdrawal statute, ineffective assistance of counsel, etc .• this C.Ourt 
should vacate the guilty plea as inappropriately entered or accepted. 
In Lafler, the U.S. Supreme C.ourt required that the defendant be placed in the same 
procedural position he had occupied before his rights were inf ringed upon. Lafler v. Cooper, 
132 S.Q. 1376, 1391 (2012). The C.Ourt went so far as to order that Michigan re-offer the 
plea bargain to the defendant, acknowledging that whether doing so affected the convictions 
and sentence depended on the trial court's exercise of its legal discretion with regard to plea 
bargains. Id. 
Rettig's conviction is illegitimate because his guilty plea is based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel and was entered in violation of the constitutional requirement that 
guilty pleas be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The plea withdrawal statute blocks his 
ability to vindicate his rights in either direct violation of the constitutional rights themselves 
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or in violation of Utah's right to appeal, which is designed to provide a method to assert 
those rights, and others. 
1his C.ourt should allow Rettig to develop the record below on his ineffective 
assistance claim and strike or vacate the guilty plea if ineffective assistance is established. 
This would place Rettig in the position in which he stood before he entered an 
unconstitutional guilty plea. Alternatively, this C.ourt should reinstate Rettig's original motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, which was withdrawn by replacement counsel, and allow Rettig 
to proceed forward based on the granting or denial of that motion. As a second alternative, 
this C.ourt should acknowledge that the guilty plea was based on an insufficient factual basis 
and strike the guilty plea and allow Rettig to proceed forward from there. 
II. Rettig received ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage 
and when replacement counsel withdrew Rettig's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea.8 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. C.onstitution states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
~ the accused shall enjoythe right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 
Counsel must be effective. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). Without 
effective counsel, we cannot have faith in the reliability of the adversarial system and its 
outcome. Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 1 11, 175 P.3d 530. To show ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the appellant must demonstrate ( 1) that counsel's perf onnance was deficient, and 
_;; (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
8 The arguments in this Part are based largely on facts alleged, but not on the record. Rule 
23B remand is necessaryto develop facts on the record. Rettig's 23B motion is unresolved. 
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Performance was deficient when counsel's actions "fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, 1 12 (internal <i> 
citations omitted). Prejudice is established by showing a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome if the deficiencywere corrected. Id. at 113. Reasonable probability is not a more-
likely-than-not standard, but merely a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. In the context of a guilty-plea conviction, it is unnecessaryto demonstrate 
reasonable probability of success at trial. Prejudice is demonstrated if there is a reasonable 
probabilitythat the defendant would have insisted on trial, instead of pleading guilty, absent 
coW1Sel's deficiency. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
Rettig's counsel was deficient as set forth in the following subparts of this Part. 
A C.ounsel did not adequately discuss with Rettig the law of accomplice liability. 
"After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel 
should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case[.]" 
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Defense Function Standard 4-5.l(a); 
Utah R Prof. C.ond. 1.4(6). C.ounsel must not intentionally mislead the client about the law. 
See ABA Criminal Justice Standards Defense Function Standard 4-5.1(6). 
C.ourts have found counsel to be deficient where counsel's advice regarding the law is 
either mistaken or intentionally misstated. See, e.g., United States v. Moonry, 497 FJd 397 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (holding as ineffective assistance where defendant pled guilty based on coW1Sel's 
mistaken representation that there was no d~fense of justification); see also Garcia v. State, 237 
PJd 716 (N.M 2010). 
32 
·,.J 
This C.Ourt has found counsel ineffective where 
. . . it is unclear from the record before us whether [ counsel] carefully analyzed 
the law and the facts and laid out the options for [defendant] prior to 
[defendant's] initial guilty plea hearing or whether he simply encouraged 
[defendant] to plead guilty to capital homicide on the basis of his own 
judgment that [defendant] was guilty of capital homicide. 
State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,436 (Utah 1996). 
In this case, Rettig alleges that neither Esplin, Frazier, Boyle, nor Facemyer explained 
to him Utah's law of accomplice liability under Utah C.Ode § 76-2-202. C.Ounsel told Rettig 
his mere presence while Bond killed Mortensen made Rettig guilty of aggravated murder. 
C.Ounsel did not lay out the law and the facts before Rettig and allow him to make a decision. 
C.Ounsel encouraged Rettig to plead guilty to aggravated murder on the basis of their own 
judgment that Rettig was guilty of aggravated murder. 
Mere presence, does not make a person culpable of a crime committed by someone 
else. To be found guilty of a crime physically committed by someone else, the State is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the same mental 
state required for the offense and either solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionallyaided the other person to commit the offense. Utah C.Ode § 76-2-202. 
Furthermore, intentionally aiding a person to commit one offense does not make a 
defendant culpable for all offenses committed by that person during the same course of 
.;; events. The State must make a separate showing with respect to each crime that the 
defendant had a culpable mental state with respect to, and intentionally aided in the 
commission of the crime. 
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Rettig being present and intentionally aiding in a robbery should not make him guilty 
of a murder committed by another person during the robbery. Rettig maintained from the 
beginning that he did not know that Bond was going to kill Mortensen. After Bond had 
killed Mortensen, Rettig prevented the further deaths of Roger and Pamela Mortensen. 
Evidence was sufficient to suggest that Rettig did not "solicit[], request[], command□, 
encourage□, or intentionally aid" Bond to kill Mortensen, as would be required for Rettig to 
be found guilty of the murder of Mortensen. See Utah Code § 76-2-202.9 
Counsel below should have correctly advised Rettig about what the State was 
required to prove to convict Rettig of Aggravated Murder. Failing to do so falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional nonns. See Strickland. 
Rettig would not have pled guilty to aggravated murder, but would have insisted on a trial 
had he been properly instructed on the law of accomplice liability. 
B. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide Rettig with 
discovezy: materials from the State. 
A defense attorney has an ethical duty to keep his client informed regarding the 
representation, including a dutyto "promptlycomplywith reasonable requests for 
information." Utah R Prof. Cond. l.4(a)(3), (4). "[I]f the client requests a full copy of the file 
or certain reports or inf onnation, unless otherwise restricted, it must be provided to the 
client, unless exceptional circumstances apply." Utah State Bar Ethics AdvisoiyOpinion 
Committee, Op. No. 06-04, December 8, 2006, 115. When making a determination whether 
to accept or reject a plea offer, a defendant should be in possession of facts pertinent to such 
9 For a further discussion on the application of the law of accomplice liability to the facts at 
issue in this case, see Pan III, infra, dealing with the sufficiency of the factual basis used to 
support the entry of the guilty plea to the charge of aggravated murder. 
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a decision, including evidence the State intends to use against the Defendant should the 
matter go to trial. When a client asks for a copy of any discovery, generally his attorney 
cannot refuse. 
In this matter, Rettig requested copies of the discovery from his attorneys several 
times prior to his entry of guilty pleas. C.Opies were not forthcoming. It was only after he 
told his attorneys of his intent to withdraw his pleas that a copy of his discovery was 
provided to him. Rettig was not fully in possession of the facts of his case when he entered 
his pleas, due to his attorneys' failure to provide the requested portions of his file. This 
failure falls below the attorney's ethical obligations and objective standards of 
reasonableness, and undermines our confidence that Rettig would have entered the same 
plea had he been informed of the evidence against him. 
C C.Ounsel rendered ineffective assistance by pressuring Rettig to plead guilty 
throu_gh the unethical involvement of Rettig' s family rather than abiding 
Rettig-'s decision to reject the plea offer. 
An attorney is bound by his client's decision with respect to the entry of a plea. Utah 
R Prof. Cond. 1.2(a); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding counsel 
ineffective in pressuring defendant to reject a plea offer rather than abide by the client's 
decision with respect to what plea to enter). Furthermore, an attorney owes a duty of 
confidentiality to the client and must "not reveal information relating to the representation 
yg of a client unless the client gives informed consent," the disclosure is necessaryto fulfill the 
client's objectives, or as otherwise pennitted by the Rules of Professional C.Onduct. Utah R 
Prof. C.Ond 1.6(a). 
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Rettig informed his coW1Sel that he was rejecting the State's proposed plea agreement 
wherein Rettig would plead guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping in 
exchange for a 25-to-Life agreed sentence. Rettig's coW1Sel did not inform the prosecution 
of Rettig' s rejection, did not seek a more favorable plea agreement, and did not set the 
matter for trial. Instead, counsel violated Rettig's trust and called Rettig's family into a 
meeting where confidential information related to the representation was freely shared with 
Rettig's family members without Rettig's consent. The purpose of the meeting was to enlist 
the help of Rettig's familyto exert pressure on Rettig to accept the plea offer. 
Counsel may have felt that Rettig was making a mistake in rejecting the state's offer. 
The mistake was Rettig's to make. His attorney's dutywas to support Rettig's decision and, if 
the matter was ultimately set for trial, give Rettig the best trial he could give him. Counsel, by 
fighting Rettig' s choice and recruiting Rettig' s family to pressure Rettig, stripped Rettig of 
this important choice. Had counsel fulfilled their proper role of advising and supporting 
Rettig in his choice of plea, Rettig's rejection of the plea off er would have been 
communicated to the State, and the matter would either have been set for trial or resulted in 
a more favorable plea agreement. 
D. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by instructing Rettig to admit to a 
factual statement he believed to be untrue, state his agreement to a promise to 
testify to which he did not agree, and mislead the court regarding whether he 
understood his rights and plea, and whether he was satisfied with his 
attorneys. 
An attorney owes a duty of candor to the court. Utah R Prof. C.ond. 3 .3. The 
attorney must not off er a false statement of material fact or fail to correct a false statement 
of material fact. Id. 3.3(a)(1). It is unethical for an attomeyto request or pennit his client to 
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lie to the court. Id. 3.3(a)(3). C.Ounsel may be ineffective for making such misrepresentations 
where it concerns the factual basis for enuyof a guilty plea. United States v. DeSimone, 736, 
F.Supp.2d 477 (D.RI. 2010) (C.Ounsel was ineffective where defendant insisted the factual 
statement was untrue, but counsel instructed defendant to accept the recitation, and where 
counsel led defendant to understand that lying to the coutt was necessaiy to get his plea 
accepted.). 
In the instant matter, not only did counsel below instruct Rettig to admit to a factual 
statement which Rettig told them was untrue, they did so over Rettig' s request that the 
Statement be changed. Furthermore, counsel instructed Rettig to accept a plea condition 
(testifying against Bond) to which they lmew Rettig did not agree, and likely would not 
honor, even after Rettig expressed dissatisfaction with the condition. When discussing the 
written factual statement to support the proposed plea, Rettig told his attorneys that it was 
untrue. Rettig could not, in good faith, tell the judge that the factual statement contained a 
report of what had happened on the date of the alleged offenses. Rettig offered changes to 
the factual statement so that it would reflect the truth as Rettig saw it. Rettig' s counsel told 
him that theywould take Rettig's offered changes and discuss them with the prosecutor. 
Instead, they made no effort to have Rettig's changes incorporated into the plea statement. 
When it came time for Rettig to enter his plea, the statement remained as it had been. No 
~ changes were discussed with the prosecutor or incorporated. The consequence of this 
inaction was that counsel offered a factual basis containing significant untruths, and the 
district court accepted it. At the very least, counsel knew that Rettig did not believe the facts 
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he admitted to and neither prevented Rettig from entering those admissions nor corrected 
the district court's belief that Rettig was entering an honest admission.10 
The plea statement included a provision that Rettig must testify truthfully against 
Bond if called to do so. In the moments immediately preceding the entiy of the plea hearing, 
Rettig was looking over the plea statement and found the agreement to testify. He expressed 
concern and wanted that agreement taken out. His attorneys, instead of infonning the 
prosecution or the judge that Rettig would not agree to such a provision, told Rettig that 
"it's all just legal jargon" and that Rettig would never be called upon to testify. C.ounsel 
engaged in three-way misrepresentations: counsel misrepresented to Rettig his duties under 
the plea agreement and misrepresented to the prosecutor and the judge whether Rettig 
agreed to the provisions of the plea statement. 
Finally, Rettig's attorneys instructed him how to respond to the district court's 
colloquy with him They instructed him to answer affirmatively when asked whether he 
understood his rights. They instructed him to express satisfaction with his attorneys advice 
and assistance. They instructed him to saythat he did not have any questions. They 
instructed him to say that he understood the plea that he was entering. They did not instruct 
him to answer honestly and truthfully the questions the court would ask of him. Rettig, 
following the instructions of his attorneys, went through the motions of answering the 
court's colloquy, giving all the correct answers for his plea to be accepted, despite the 
extreme reservations he felt and had expressed to his attorneys. 
10 Even if the factual basis contained in the plea statement was completely true, it was 
insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated murder. See Part III, infra. 
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Had Rettig's concerns regarding the plea statement's factual basis and testimony 
provision been adequately addressed or acknowledged, Rettig likely would not have pled 
guilty but would have insisted upon trial. The failure of trial counsel to negotiate changes to 
the plea statement was a primary-reason Rettig gave for his desire to withdraw his plea. 
Rl 15. Furthermore, had counsel instructed Rettig to honestly answer the district court's 
questions, Rettig would likely have expressed his concerns with the plea he was entering, 
which may have resulted in the court refusing to take Rettig's guilty plea. We cannot have 
confidence that the outcome would have been the same absent counsel's errors. 
E. There is a reasonable probability that absent counsel's deficiencies, Rettig 
would not have pied gyilty and would have insisted on trial. 
It is not necessary that any single deficiency of counsel satisfy the Strick/and prejudice 
prong j£ the cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficiencies is such that we cannot have 
confidence in the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors [plural, all 
errors considered together], the result of the proceeding would have been different."); see also 
Hanis ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 FJd 1432, 1438-39 (9th Gr. 1995) (stating, "We do not 
hesitate to conclude that there is a reasonable probabilitythat, absent the deficiencies, the 
outcome of the trial might well have been different," and holding that analysis of individual 
prejudicial effect of each deficiency is unnecessclf}?; if. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 
1471 (10th Gr. 1990) ("[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate onlythe effect of 
matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors."). 
Rettig was severely prejudiced by the combined effect of counsel's deficient conduct. 
After Rettig's plea was entered, Rettig attempted to correct what he felt was a miscarriage of 
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justice by withdrawing his guilty plea and correcting the misrepresentations that had been 
made to the district court. Rl 15-14. Rettig wrote as follows: 
I feel as I have been inadequately represented by my current legal counsel. I 
feel I was pressured into agreeing to the plea agreement set forth by the 
prosecution. I also feel it was wrong of my attorneys [sic] to tell me to claim 
false events in open court as fact. But more importantly, I am ashamed of 
myself for doing so, knowing it was the wrong thing to do. 
R114. Rettig's reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea reflect some of the same reasons his 
counsel's conduct was deficient as argued herein- namely, his attorneys failed to adequately " 
discuss the case with Rettig, his attorneys did not provide Rettig with the State's evidence 
against him, his attorneys failed to have the factual basis changed to reflect what Rettig 
believed to be truth, and Rettig was pressured into accepting a plea offer he did not want to 
accept. Rl 15-14. 
Each of counsel's errors combines with the others to nndennine confidence in the 
correctness of the outcome. Rettig's attorneys did not explain the law of accomplice liability, 
that the State would be required to prove that Rettig intentionally aided, solicited, or 
commanded the murder of Kay Mortensen in order to convict Rettig of aggravated murder. 
Rettig' s story is that he did not know Bond would kill Kay Mortensen until it was too late to 
do anything about it, and that he stepped in to intervene before Bond could kill more 
people. Rettig's attorneys did not tum over the portions of Rettig's file containing the State's 
discovery until after the plea was entered, making it impossible for Rettig to evaluate the 
strength of the State's case against him. Rettig in fact rejected the State's plea offer, though 
that rejection was never communicated to the State. Instead Rettig's family was brought into 
the case without Rettig's consent in order to pressure Rettig into accepting the plea offer. 
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Rettig' s counsel even went so far as to insist that Rettig admit as a fact a statement which 
Rettig had told them was untrue, and to answer the district court's colloquy in a very specific 
way, regardless of whether Rettig' s answers were truthful. Had Rettig' s attorneys behaved 
differently, there is a reasonable probability Rettig would not have entered a guilty plea, but 
would have insisted upon trial. 
F. Rettig's counsel was ineffective in withdrawing Rettig's motion to withdraw 
his plea without Rettig's consent where there was evidence that the plea was 
unknowing and involuntary. 
The ineffectiveness alleged in this Part, supra, all have some effect on the 
lmowingness and voluntariness of Rettig's plea. The plea cannot be said to be a !mowing 
plea if Rettig was not properly advised of the elements the State would be required to show 
in order to prove that Rettig was guilty of aggravated murder. One cannot lmow what one is 
pleading to unless one understands the elements of the offense. 
Rettig's plea was not a knowing plea where Rettig was not granted access to the 
discovery provided by the State and contained in his counsel's file. Rettig was not fully aware 
of the evidence the State had against Rettig and could not evaluate the strength of the State's 
case. Rettig thus could not make an informed decision whether to accept or reject the State's 
plea offer. Rettig's plea was thus not a !mowing plea. 
Rettig's plea was not voluntarywhere his counsel never communicated to the State 
Rettig's rejection of the plea offer, and instead enlisted the assistance of Rettig's family to 
pressure Rettig into accepting the State's offer. Rettig's choice was to plead not guilty. His 
attorneys refused to allow Rettig to make that choice. Rettig' s plea was thus not voluntary. 
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In this matter, after Rettig had filed his own written motion with the district court 
attempting to withdraw his plea {R115-14), conflict counsel was appointed {R132). Instead 
of pursuing Rettig, s goal of withdrawing his plea, conflict counsel withdrew Rettig, s motion. 
R411:24-25. Had conflict counsel pursued the motion, one of two things would have 
happened: 1) the motion would have been granted, in which case Rettig's objective of 
preserving his right to a trial would have been fulfilled; or 2) the motion would have been 
denied in which case Rettig would have proceeded to sentencing. There is no tactical basis 
for conflict coUI_1Sel's decision to not pursue Rettig's stated objectives. There is a reasonable 
likelihood that the motion to withdraw Rettig' s plea would have been successful and a 
different outcome would have resulted. 
III. The district court erred when it accepted Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated 
murder where the factual basis of the plea did not support Rettig's conviction 
for aggravated murder as party or as accomplice.11 
A Factual Basis Required 
A trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it finds that "a factual basis [exists] 
for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant ... " Utah R Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). The requirement of a finding 
of a sufficient factual basis is a requirement of Due Process. See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 
440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). 
11 This C.ourt may lack jurisdiction to consider the error asserted in this Part if Utah C.ode 
§ 77-13-6(2)(c) survives Rettig's constitutional challenge. This is an example of whythe 
statute is unconstitutional. The statute bars all challenges to a guilty plea save those timely 
and related to lmowledge and voluntariness. A motion to withdraw a plea based on whether 
the plea was intelligent or whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel 
cannot be granted ( or its denial reversed on appeal). 
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Admittedly, court rules "prescribe the method bywhich individuals enforce their 
rights," are ''procedural in nature, and cannot create or modify substantive rights." State v. 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27,140,279 PJd 371. Further, variances from rule 11 not affecting 
substantial rights are to be disregarded. Utah R Crim. P. 11 (ij. However, expounding on rule 
11 (ij, this C.ourt has suggested that the substantial right implicated by rule 11 is the right of 
defendants to knowingly and voluntarily make their pleas. Alexander, 143. That suggestion is 
problematic. The right for a defendant's plea to be knowing and voluntary is a constitutional 
right. Id. 116. The abilityto withdraw an unknowing and/ or involuntary plea is a right 
granted by the Utah Legislature. See id. 1 41. These two rights are not identical, even if the 
latter is designed to enforce the former. Presumably, even a state lacking a plea withdrawal 
statute must answer as to whether the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary (and entered 
with effective assistance of counse~ under the U.S. constitution. 
Moreover, the constitutional right in question is the right for a guilty plea to be 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. 116. The requirement in rule 11(e)(4)(B) for a sufficient 
factual basis is specifically designed to ensure that the guiltyplea is intelligent in addition to 
being knowing and voluntary.12 Interestingly, Utah's plea withdrawal statute does not allow a 
plea to be withdrawn because it was unintelligent. Technically, the legislature may decide 
12 By design, Rule 11 conf onns to its federal counterpart, which ensures pleas were 
intelligent. See Utah R Crim. P. 11 AdvisoryC.ommittee Notes (stating that "[t]he addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), 
and is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983)"); Fed. R Crim. P. 11 Notes of AdvisoryC.ommittee on Rule-1966 Amendment 
(stating that the factual basis requirement "protect[s] a defendant who is in the position of 
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing 
that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge"); see also Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444 
n.2 (acknowledging that instances of unintelligent, voluntary, and knowing pleas must be 
guarded against, even if rare). 
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whether to allow plea withdrawal and for what reasons, but the federal constitution imposes 
requirements on pleas that cannot be circumvented. Utah's plea withdrawal statute does not 
leave room for a constitutional challenge to a plea, but operates to bar any challenge to a 
guilty plea that does not complywith the statute's terms, including those challenges based on 
federal constitutional rights. 
B. Aggravated Murder 
Pursuant to Utah C.ode § 76-2-202, a defendant may only be convicted of a crime if, 
"acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense [he] directly 
commits the offense, [or] solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense[.]" To be guilty of 
aggravated murder, a person must "intentionally or knowingly cause□ the death of another 
under any of [an enumerated list of circumstances, including] incident to an act, scheme, or 
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to 
commit aggravated robbery, robbery, . . . aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated 
kidnapping, or kidnapping[.] Utah C.ode § 76-5-202(1)(d). 
C Plain Error 
The question of whether the factual basis supported the guilty plea to aggravated 
murder (and thus whether Rettig' s plea was intelligent) is a constitutional issue exempted 
from the preservation rule because Rettig' s liberty is at stake. Alternatively, Rettig requests 
that the issue be reviewed on plain error. To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, the 
appellant is required to show that "(~ an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful .... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
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1993). "[I]n appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion to dispense with the 
vu requirement of obviousness so that justice can be done, as when an error not readily 
apparent to the court or counsel proves harmful in retrospect." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 
35 n.8 (Utah 1989). The error is harmful if it is a sufficient basis to undermine confidence in 
the outcome reached below. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
D. Insufficient Factual Basis & Unintelligent Plea 
The factual basis for Rettig's guilty plea to aggravated murder, as set forth in the plea 
statement was as follows: 
[Incident to a scheme to commit robbery- of several fireanns from Mortensen,] 
Bond told Mortensen to kneel down in front of the bathtub with his back to 
us. While Mortensen was kneeling down, I was holding Mortensen at 
gunpoint with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a lmife from his person and 
then placed the lmife back in his pocket. At this point, Bond left the 
bathroom, went downstairs and returned with a black-handled lmife 
approximately 10 to 12 inches in length. Upon returning, I observed Bond take the 
knije and slice Mortensen's throat. I am not certain how many times Bond cut 
Mortensen's throat. After cutting his throat, I observed Bond stab Mortensen 
in the base of his neck with the same knife. 
R60 ( emphasis added). The factual basis given orally by the State was essentially identical. 
R410:29-30. 
The factual basis used to support the entry- of a guilty plea to aggravated murder did 
not indicate that Rettig acted with the mental state required for a conviction. The factual 
basis clearly indicates that Rettig did not personally cause the death of Mortensen. The 
factual basis also does not indicate that Rettig solicited, requested, commanded, or 
encouraged Bond to cause the death of Kay Mortensen. For Rettig to be criminally liable for 
the death of Kay Mortensen, the factual basis must clearly demonstrate (1) that Rettig 
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intended Kay Mortensen to die or knew that Kay Mortensen would die; and (2) that Rettig 
intentionally aided Bond to cause the death of Kay Mortensen. 
The only allegation that may remotely point to Rettig' s mental state is the allegation 
that Rettig held Mortensen at gunpoint in the bathroom while Bond went downstairs. There 
is no indication that Rettig knew Bond was retrieving a knife or knew what Bond intended 
to do with the knife. It is stated that Rettig "observed" Bond kill Mortensen-not "assisted," 
"helped," or "aided," but "observed." Being a witness to a crime does not make Rettig a 
participant in that crime, even if Rettig participated in other crimes. 
Rettig's reaction to Bond's threatened killing of Roger and Pam Mortensen further 
negates the elements of knowledge or intent. After Rettig had "observed" what Bond had 
done to Kay Mortensen, once he fully understood of what Bond was capable, and finally had 
knowledge or belief of what Bond intended to do, Rettig intervened to prevent Bond from 
killing anyone else. R60-61;410:30-3L.It is clear from the factual basis submitted that, 
although Rettig participated in burglary, robbery, and kidnapping, he lacked the mental state 
required for commission of aggravated murder. He did not intend Mortensen to die and did 
not know that Bond was going to kill Mortensen until it was too late. 
By accepting the factual basis in this case as sufficient for aggravated murder and by 
accepting the guilty plea, the district court violated both rule 11 and Rettig's right to enter an 
intelligent plea. 
The insufficiency of the factual basis should have been clear to the district court. At 
the very least, dispensing with the obviousness requirement is necessary so that justice may 
be done and Rettig's conviction for aggravated murder may be undone. Had the district 
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court recognized the insufficiency of the factual basis, there is a reasonable probability that it 
would not have accepted Rettig' s guilty plea to the charge of aggravated murder. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, PRE:MISES CONSIDERED, Rettig requests that he be permitted 
to develop the factual basis for his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 
guilty plea be stricken or vacated upon his establishing he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel Or, if ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to replacement counsel 
withdrawing Rettig motion to withdraw plea, the C.ourt should reinstate Rettig' s original 
motion to withdraw his plea. Alternatively, the Court should strike or vacate the guilty plea 
because it was based on an insufficient factual basis. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of April, 2016. 
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U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
[RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable 
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release 
of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM 8 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 3-5 
Article VIII, Section 3. Uurisdiction of Supreme Court.] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, 
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause. 
Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court-Judges pro 
tempore-Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may 
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided 
by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and 
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of 
the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct 
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
Article VIII, Section 5. Uurisdiction of district court and other courts-Right of 
appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district comt 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, 
ADDENDUM C 
both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
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UTAH CODE, SECTION 77-13-6. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court 
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw 
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, 
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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4TH :<DISTRIQT CT ~ AF 
'UTAH. COUNTY, STATE OF ·UTAH 
FlL:-Eio· 
r1rc·ft1~ 2M1· .. 
l.· c. . .1 "'!· . _u. I 
4 i'n u1S[R1C.: t 
STATE OF UTJii; 
STATE· OF UTAH· · · 1 :TA_ HCO_ ti'-. ,.,··,: MINUTES '" 
. . . . . . ,, . . .. SENTENCING Plaintlff, 
. 
•. sEN'l?mtc:s, · .j(Jn~:, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
BENJAMIN·DAVID ·RETTIG, 
nefe-xida.rit . .; 
PRESENT 
Clerk: rosew 
P.rpsecutor·: TAYLOR,: TIMOTHY· ·L 
Deff endari.t 
:, C.a~.e .. No.:. 101101608.·: ·FS 
Judg~t THOMAS .LOW 
: Date: December ·13_, ·2011. 
Defendant·•s A~torney.{s) :. FACEMYER,. DANA M 
DEFENDANT INFO~TION 
Pate :pf ·birth:· .·Nov~Jnb~r 9.., 1987 
Audio 
Tape Number.: :2 :Tape count: 2-:55' 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED MURDER - ls't Degree Felony 
. Ple~i .. c:fu.i'fty . -~ :D.i_i:1pp$it:iQ:r;;t: 0'~/02 /2.011 GuiJ.ty 
-~ .... AGGRAVATED KIDNAP,;J:NG: .... la.t. Degre~: Fel.CJ:ny 
Plea: Guilty ~- Di$pos,ition: 06/02/2·011 G:uilty 
H~ING 
Ti;t,is· :wat;:t~r coin~s 1>.~ior.e tlJ.e .. cq~t fq:r $entencirig ~ Th~. cl~f.epd~t· 
cipp~~;r~· tn.. cµst;:q~y ... The_ p~r.J:i.~s. ~d.dr~E?S· tlle ca~e bef9;t::e· th~ qoµ~!' 
-;F~mily pt the: defendant :anq fcimi1y of.· the. victiJn addre~s the .. co~rt. ~-
The defendant. :adcb:esses. :the. court. 
The defendant, is sentenced. 
SENTENCE.PRISON 
J3ased c>ri. t,lie:! qe._terid~nt;/_L?. :pc;,ny~ct:~on 9f A~$V~'I'EP .fvIIDW,ER .. jl ~-~:t G,., 
Degr~~ .,~10:q.y, tbe d<e.fepdant i~ a.e.ntence.~, to. .:a.n ipdeterniinat~ term 
f:r;om 25· to Life years. in. the Utah State Prison. 
Based ·on .. ,the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAl?lNG a ls.t 
Degree·: Fel9Iiy1_ the defendant is sentenced to. an indeterminate term 
qf ri.6~; less tq:an fifteen years ang wliid;i qi~y· l:>e i1fE!- ·.in tP.~; -'µ~~h 
state Prison_. · · · · · · · · · · · 
,To the_ UT~ Cq~t.Y $heriff..: :Th~. d~ .. f.~11d~~t. ~s· remcµ)ded ._t:q_ yo:u,r 
c;u_a~ody fo;r; tr~spqrtation t.o Jlj~ Uta,h 81::~~-e .. PrisoA -wher¢ th:e 
d~fendant will l;>e confined. .. 
ADDENDUM E 
00-0JS2 
r;:., .. 
·..d 
Case ··No: :10110.1668 Date: Dec 13, 2011 
SENT~NCEPRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence i~ to run concurrently on·each count. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The court. recommends a<finf3 of $10000. o.o on cowit 1 and a fine· of 
$100Cl0 •. Od ·ori count ~. The. couxt also recomrriep.ds. ret:ititution in the 
amo:unt. of $10671 .. 71 for Crime Victimes Reparations. Restitution is 
to be joint and :several. Parole is recommended . 
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.Rf THE FO'QRTH JUDlciAL DISTRICT COURT' 
UTAH COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH 
Ftt:eo-
JUN o ftou 
nH C-IS iRIC.T 
STATE OFU'TAH 
UiAH CQUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH,. S'fAtE~,QFO.EF~:N.DA.NT 
)N .SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA OR 
::Plam,filt Nd CONTEST A.NI) CERTIFIC.ATB OF 
vs. 
t>efendant 
COUNSEL 
Case No.101101668 
Judge noqias Low 
I, Benjamin David Rettig, herel;>y aclm<>.wl~dge anq cer:tifythatihave been advised of 
and that I und~stand the following facts and)ights: . 
C~e & SfaU:1,t~ry Provisions· 
Notification of Chat2es 
.DegreeMm/M~ Punishme;nt, 
Fine+90o/o surcharge 
Criminal Homicide,, Aggravated Murder Fl NfaxpllUI11 penalty is dea~ life without the 
b.c.A. §76~5-202 possibility of par<;>le Qr an mdeten:nittate 
prison term of notless than 25 yearsWbi~h 
maybe for life. Fine of$20,0QO. tto;oeo 
7u 
1'b~ 
Aggravated'1Gdnaping 
. . . . . 
. Fl Maximum p~natt:y is·life without parole o,:-
. . ... . .. -~ T,.,r ,r1, v_: __ ·1· ... JJ. 
D@'} rl $, t "'rs, years to life. Fine l.)ll 
of~O,0QQ.Jft9~-~ -~ 
rt:t ~bt 
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____________ Exp~atoey::N9te ___________ _ 
Wh,en_prop.m.-ly filled. out; the following Statement of Defendant in Support-of Guilty Plea 
contains afi th~r~ein~ts of~W~ U(e), Utah:R..µ1~:of._G.ri~al.I.>.roc~ui~.Jfth~Di~ct. 
Court chooses fcn:-ely 01:t'this statement for pmposes of stclct.oompliance ·With Rule 11, it must 
1liake thcffacf.krio~ on the record by·refemngto-'1:he stater.nenton the·record asking defendant if 
he or she read, understood and acknowledged the ·cont~ts of the statement· If the defendant 
canµ9t .~ or µnderstand English, ·the Court should ascertain '.on· the record that the• statement 
li~ 'been.te,a4pf ~ated tc{the-defendant. Altho~gh this {orin is for a guilty or no oon~t ple~ 
itmaybe.adapted.forAl/ord pleas~ 
□ E~qeable. Sec.ond Offense. (Onlyµ checked:;) 
lknowthat if I ·am cofrvided .in the future oftbis:same crime the·secorid corivictfon will 
' ..... ·. . ... ·.' .. ,• . .· .. ·· . . ,: . ,, ,· . : . •. : ( ·· .. ,•, .. -. :· •.·.. .... ·~: . ' .-:··. - ·' ·. •' .. •'· . . . . . . · .. · - . , . - . ',' ' . · ... ·.: .·'. . . . . .. . : : . 
be a [Class __ Misdemeanoror __ Degree Felony.] The maximum penaltyf~r that ·crime··is 
lhereby··acknowledge and certify that lhave been advised of and'th.at I understand the 
rolJ,owµigJ~ctfand:Jigh.ts_: · · 
Eiements of Offense 
I haye r~eived:a-'copy of the:_(Amended) Information ·against 1ne~ . I have read it,, Qr h~:it · 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty. ' .', ' . . , . ' ' . . 
The elements ·of .. the crlnie(s) to which l atrrpleacling gnil.ty -~e: 
' . . . ' ' . . . . . ' 
Cotm.tl: Cninhial Homicide, Aggravated Murder . . ... . _ _ 
1) On or·abotifNovember'l6;'2009;in Utah Counfy, Utah, I intentfonallyorlm.0W111gly:caused 
the dea~ of ari.othetodnteritionallyaided another person· fo intentionally orlm.owingly cause the 
death of another and, · ••· , 
2) the homicide was _committed incident to an act scheme, course of conduc~ or criminal 
episg~e.4{$.g which the a~tor co~tted or a«emp~ed to 991Dllljt aggr,ava:ted robbecy, r61'bery, 
aggravated burglary, burglary; agw.avated kidnaping, or kidnaping; · 
~fthe ho~9i~e· was ~oµnnitleq_ fo.r p~l:llli~ gahi;.- . . . 
4,ffiehoroidde was committed m.m ~speci:aIJ.y:eemo~, maia:as, Sftlel, et eKeeptienally · 
O:et9. _r~.-.l~e._: m .. - .~. er, ~n3 ..,o~.::s~~~chm. ll~tb_e~emonshated .. h.YJ»ly··.~icai t.vtt;me, sefiousphys~ 
-;ah:;~H; m: seg01Js· bodily ~:ar,· eff:he netim befvxe detl.th ·~ ~ 1 L ,Y-
Countlf Aggravated Iudfulriing, 
l)J)not. about' November:J612009,,fa Utah County Utah, during the course ofcommitti,ng 
unlawful d~tention .or kic4la.pilig;' I-cJid: -.· . . . . · 
2) possess,. use; or threaten to ustfa dangerous wea.'.p.on.as defiiied-·in Utalf Code Section 7 6~1-
o01; or · 
3) act Witb:intent: 
2., 
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(~) t~ ;facilitate the commfssio~ attempted commissio1,1; or flight after qozµniissi9n pt ~enip~ed 
colllllll$.sion.of ~ JelQny; · · 
(b) to hind~ or dela.y .the q.iscovezy ofotreporting of a felony; 
(c) to infilctbodily~jury--on·orto.terrorizethe'7fotitn Qr.~9ther. 
Adniitted Facts 
1 uncl~d th.8:i 'by pJ~l.l-g, gqjlty,. I am ,adrn1ttmg thatJ committed the thregoing 
~e(s). (Qrdf I am pleadmg n9 contest, I am not contesting that I pc,µnnitt,aj.,_tht, fcm~gtj~g: 
crlmeS;:)lstipulate and agree· (or,jf l a.m·pl~4itig ri~ ~*-t~t, ~ do ~o,~ d,i$µt~ or ~ntest) thatthe 
following facts describe my conduct and 1h.e conduct of other. persons for. which I an;i c,::imiitally 
liable .. These facts providea~basis forthe Court to accept my guilty{or'no contest) piea(s)·and 
]?rove the ~lenients of the cri.me(s) to which I am pleading guilty ( ot no contest): 
On or about November 16, 2009, M.t;l'f#li Bpnd(''B/n:z!l") @d ltr.f-O'ele,fin:Bon.d'., vehicle.front 
VemaJ,·.Utalt. ,() lfay],,fprtilt$.~'s (''Mortensen'?, ho1!1,e in Spanish· Fork, Utah. ,T/tepurpo~e ir.i, · 
frayeling to MiJHensen/s. honte was to steal ft;reo.rm$ l<J~ated. in .. !4p11eJ~en~s r.,.011~_4-: Upon, 
ariivilig at,M:ortensen's home~ Bond indicate{l_he·w()uld iiiitiidly enter·the home and then.I 
Wll$ ig follow him and 'also enter the home. Iionil an.di entertd tile bome wi,!hout being bivitetl 
tind we had a handgun wit~ us. Pond placed zip #es 011/ Mort_enseit atid both ojus ,were: 
wearing ski masks and latex gloves in order to hide our identities. We commanded Mortf]M,~~ 
to show us where his firearms were iocated. Moi1en$ei:, to()k JlS to a cunke,r located bt;~iif!l his 
home. and 'We obse,,,ed several_ ·weapons. We took Mortensen jr(Jm the bunker and back into 
his :home~ After :re:..entering the home, :we took Mortensen upstairs to ·a bathroo~ 11.0.nd. told 
JJ{~rlensen to kneel down in front' of the bathtub with his back to ut _ Wnib{lJ{~fte~e.n ~~ 
kneeling down, I was holdzng Morten.ten at gunpoint with JJon.if.'s :handgun. Bond 'withdrew a 
knife front his p~r~°'!' and then placed dte knife back in Ms.pocket. At thispoin~ ~ond _leffthe 
bizthrooliti went downstairs and returned -with a black.;.h_andled kttif'!t appro,ximate~ J(J' to 12 
inches in kngifi:- Upo,~ r(ftriniing, ['observed Bond take-the knife a11.d slice Mortensen !$,tl~ro.~ 
f .q11f'fi<4. ¢.~rt.~· 'how 'iitttfiyi:,times Bond cut' Mortensen's th,ro~ ;After c.iitti11,g his thtota, I 
observedB01tdstab Morknsen 'in tlt~hase of his fleck with tlt'e :sa11te ltnzfe. 
$hottly· (!,jtet~'Bond 'cut and·.stabbed Mortens~,i, we.}t~{lr4 Si}lne~#t knock 01.i .m:e fr~iit door~ t 
raitiiownst¢.r.s.tin.4 !.u.4.. l>el#ntl.. Pi.~ frqnt door,p,1id :,Jp1td.ope11ed· the .. do:o_r. Ajeni~ :fl.1tifmfzJe.: 
were· itt 'ffee. door. asking/or Motteiisett. (.(,~r·if.iS.cQVeret{ tht#.Jh~ i~4fyi4.utf4'' ~efe. p~~lq. 
and Roger Mo1·iensen.) Twas stiltho_ldbtg• th¢ liaff-dgti.if ~h,eii :J.itiiiiela and Roger eitter~d the 
ltPIJ1:~ I infofined Paniela·and Roger:that Mortensen was upstairs andt1t!z,i h~ JY~:.iJkay .. "fYe. 
·told tltem to·walk into tlte suuken living roi!,m 41id we plt;ice4, zip ties on Pamela,s and.Roger's 
.h~n4s 0:11}!.fe.e.t· 4l siJ~e'jio/itt, Bond :~ame· .out o/ the ldtch'en .with a,iQ.fher-JqjJfe wn}ch.: 1 
believed lte ·was going to use to kill Pam.ti.la ,ma ~oget~ 1 steppe4. i,1J:fr.ottt of Bond and told 'him 
not kill Pamela and B.,;igef.: 'W/t'ile :Pan,.el~ and Roger were tied up in the livfi,.g\r.oo,n, '! 
remained iii. the living' Niont: with them holdm.g fhe. handgun while._ , [J'!"(l4 . ,:~~oved 
approximately ZS. .of Mortensen.'s weapons (including Jia,ulguns u.11.d tijlesJfrrnn.. fhf!., b.J11:tkftr 
a~d placi,(tliem ir/ Bq1t4's veiiicie.- We also took ammunitionfrom the bunker; A.fteip!a~pig 
the guns and ammunition in}Jo.hil:'s vehicle, we tookR.oger's driver's license:and told'JiinJttnd 
3 
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Pan;teu.i .ilu!t. tfiey. n¢~ck.4 to tell tlte police· that three black 1it'en !tad· 'lied die11i ·up and. if they 
told ~ piilj¢¢· a t!iffer.e,iit · story, ··we knew where :they lived .amt. we, ·wo.u.14. ·¢.om~ pt.¢1' and kill 
them. We left Moi#nsen's resiilen~e and.i/f P,ve_ back #J Yem.~ ,Oi; •. ~~r:wa, back to·:vern~4 we 
stopp~d at ii rest ~op.#Jjd.d.Jsc.arde4 o.ur·glo:ves in a.dumpster. In T{emai,-Bond~m.tdl_ W.~.~t µp ~ 
ctu;:yon and buried the Weapons •. Following :-this, Bo11:d .t(}Qk.- ,ny h_q(!rJ.l/qnd shoes in orddr .to 
dispose of .item. 
. _ . Waiver of Comtitu.tional Rights 
.. _ J $ ent~g tbisJthese. plea(s) agreement -voluntarily. l undei:~tand that I -~ye the 
following rights under the ·constitutions pf!Jt~ ~d th~ J)'njt¢d ~µi~.- IJls9 understand that if t . 
. plead guilty ( or no contest) I will ·give up all the following rigb.ts: · 
CounseL 1 lmow that I.have the right to b_e represented by an atto;rney and.that if I ·cannot 
afford on.e.; an, attomeywill be ·apPointed by the' court at no cost to me. I tmderstand ~2:fl ~ght 
later, tf thejudge determined that I was able, 1,¢ required to: pay,f.or -~f appointed 1aw.yers 
service, fo :JD.e. 
11:iave not waived my right to counsel. 
1-~ J·ha.ve re~ tms· statm.ent and that lundetstandthe:nature ·and .~lem~ts. of ~e 
cl:tai-ges and crimestowhichI am pleading·guilty~ l also 1,lllderstand"riiyrlgp.t$iifUrls case and the 
cons~uences ofmyguilfyplea. - . . 
If l have not waived my right to couns~l, my a.ttor;qpys -_ ar~. fyii,chael Esplin, Stephen 
Frazier- and Anµ._Boyl~/¥.y a'fttjri.leys and I ll~ve fully discussed ·this· itatement, my-rights and the 
ci)n,sequ$ri~~ of m.twJty ptea. 
Ju.ry Ti:i~ _ I :kg.ow .U,lat I have a right to· a speedy and public trial by m,i imp¢iat 
(uilb.iased) jury ·and that f wili be:giving up th.at r.igh~ by pleading guilty~ 
~<>i1fr.ontatioli and cross~examinati.on of-wifu_esses. Lknow thaHfI were to have a jury. 
Jrlal, a) lwouicfhave the.right fo see and obsefye-the,· ,wifuesses who testified against me: and·b) . 
nii,attom~y, Qtni~~lf ifI waiyed myrightto an attorney, wcruldhave the opportunity to .cro~s~ 
exam.in~ all of the witnesses in open court wlio tesp.fied ag~iristni¢! 
)light-to compel wifrlesse·s. I know· th.art if Lw~rt,: to :~av~_J1 jw.:y tri~, I c.cnlld_ c~ 
witnesses.·•if.l chose to and I:would 'be ~ablttto obtaµi subp_oe.na,s r~g the attendance and 
~qny Qf tp.ose vyiµiess·es. If:! couid not· affotd to pay fQr the wifuesses'tQ appear,·the State 
would pay·fhose costs~ · ··. · · 
R.igbt to testify and.pr.ivU~ge. ~gajnst self-incrilniiti.it!ott. I ~o:v:(th,at tf:I Were to have 
a;trlal, lw.ould have th~ :rigl?_t-to: t~stify ·on my own behili. · t also:·1cnow.-thai-if i .chQse ~ot,.w 
~estlfy,· rio one could make me testify or make .m~ · give evi.den.qe :~gai,rl,st:p;ty~~lf, ~s,o. ~QW .that 
if I chose not to t~,: the jury would be told :that they could 'liot·nold my refusal- to testify 
·~gainst me~ · 
4 
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Presuntption of innocence ~4 bur.den :of :proof. I know-thaf ff:l: do:.not plead guilty~ ·I 
am ptes-Qlned .innocent_tj).tjlthe 'St~t~:proves thad am.:guilty·pf the .chatgeclcripie(~). If I ~hoose · 
to fight ¢e ~ges against me, tneed only pl~dflnofguilty," ,and m.y case will:be: set for a trial. 
At a :trial; the State ~ould ·have the burden ·of pro~g each element 9.f the ~~ge(s) ~eyon4 a 
reasonable doµbt If-the trial is before a jury, the. verdict .must be urianirno11S, meaning-that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. · · · 
I understarid that if t plead ,guilty; I: give )ip th.e pt.e~umption of innocence· and will be 
admftting 'that I COinlllltted .~e crift).e(s) stated: above. 
Appeal. I know that under th~ Ut$ ~e>n.stitution, ifTwere convicted by aJury or judge, I 
would: have the ij~tt6 appeal my conviction and :sentepce. ~ lce>:uld not afford-~~ costs of an. 
app¢.al, the, State worild pay those .costs for me~ By·pleadiilg guilty; I .understand my. ngl:1t to 
appeal.is limitoo. I ~q~andthat I a.in giving·up·my right to app~ m.y~nvictionfflple~ 
guilty. J ~a~4 that if I wish to appeal my sentence, I niusf file notice of appeal yiithin 3'0 
days after my sentence is enterecl~ 
. lkifow anif understand -that by pleading guilty; l_tmt waiving and giving: up all the 
statutorjand ·constitudona·z rigli-ts ·as e#,!tiJ,ied ahove. 
Consequences of Enterl.ne: a Guiltv Plea 
Potenµal_ penalties~ t.know the maxim\11.ll s~tence·th,~.t tnay be imposed for each crime 
to whichla.1i1 pleading guilty~ I know ·that by pleading guilty to a crime:tp.af carries a.Ilia,ng~tory 
penalty; I will be sµbjecting µi.yself to serving a mandatory penalty for ~at ¢rime. Tknow my 
$·ei_it.¢nce ~ayincludtra prison tettn, fine, or. both. . 
. JUndeci.~4 that ifI am ·not a T..tmted States .c;tlzen, my pJea(s) today may; or even will, 
subJect.me :.to· deportationJmd~ the 1Jmt¢. ~~t¢s ira,migration laws and. regulat.io.n.s,.:or othffle 
· adversely ·affect:my irr.rrnigra#o.:o.·:~tatus;· which may include pennanently baµ;irlg·my.t~~entry into 
the: United States~. i understand; th11t' if •I. )iave. questions · about the effect :of my ple~ 011. 111y 
immig;ration status; I should consult witl;i an immigration attorney. . . 
l know that in addition to a· fm.~, a r.ii.n.~t'Y· percent (90%): surcharge W,ill l,e imposed 
tQgeth~r with a ·security 'fee of $33.00 for each· offense to-which.I ¥.ve plead gajlty., I also kn:ow 
that I maybe ordered to make.restitution to any-victi:in(s)ofmYcrimes, includmgany-I.'estitiition 
that may be .owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agr~~ment. . 
Consecutive/concµrr¢n~ :prijon :t~rms~ Iknow ·that if':th,er~ i~ ~o.r~ 't:b.aji,.011e crime· 
inyoN~ t;h~ _sent_ences may be· imposed one aft.~t ap.Qth.~t:(CQASe¢titively),.or.-.they:mayrun at th~ 
same·time .(conCU1TenUy). 'l kn,ow ·th~ I ·may b:e charged.an-,a:dditiona1 fine. ;for.:,ea.~h. 6rµne thatl 
.,Pl~~d. Jo .. l Ql$q know·tluit if 1 am on probaH9n, 9r.ym;9l~,. pr awaiting: sentencing on another: 
.olf~~ of which I have been convicted or wbich I li~ve ·plead guilty~ my guilty :Plea(s) ,now ~Y' 
;5 
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r~t in :consecutive·sent~ces being·ilnpQ~ec:l qp)ne. Ifthe offense to· which I 'amnow·pleadmg 
guilfy;,q~¢4w.ijen I wa.s--imp~<>neci.01.= on parole, tknow tb.e1aw·requir~·~e ctjl#tl~.impose 
c;ol;i$~c.ti.tl.Ye s~tences unless the; court ·finds eiid. $tates · on tli~ record tµ~t 'ccmsecutive-.sentences 
would be.inapp:roptiate. 
Plea Agteem~nt. My guiltypl~ is the result of. a plea ba,rgajn lletw·eenmyself.and the 
· prosecutiµg aU.9m~y. NlJ:p.tf pro~~es., duties~ and provisiollS otthe plea b~gain are-fully 
c.on~~•#i·tbis plea '~eemeri~:mcluding tho$e explained below: 
I.n exfh4n~~for 11!-Y KTfiffi>.''P.leas, the stt4~ of Utah a$f.ees ~Pt t() ~e.ek. the,4e~t1Jpf!~alty 
(nJfi~ cas,e.-Iit:additio~ the Stak. <JfUtab wf,l{re~om11tettd to the Court that I receive apena/.zy 
ofnot·'les$ .fhtµi. 'ZS-yea,s, t~ life. w.#iJ :th~-pos.sibili'IJ' of parole. The State of U'tl:lh will: also . 
recomntend to the C<iurl that the charges of Aggr.av~d.MJlT:4.<#f cµid Aggravated Jruinaping· 
run concurtenily witli each otlter. ·Finally, if I receive a :,subpoen:a to testify against Maran 
Bon.,z;: {agree to appear and testify ti-uthfully. 
T~ jl.J<}.g~ not 90_$~ I ~OW: that any charge or sentencing concess.ion 0~ 
re~mmendation <5-f pro~ation or:susJ?ended._s~tence, .in~l1~diµg :a,;eductj.91l.pfi}i~ charges for 
-sentenclng, made or ~ougp.t b.y either d~fense oounsel ot the prosecuting attorney are "no_t binding 
.on:the judge. I-also know th.at _any <>pinions they express to me ag.fo what.tli¢Y,belieye the judge 
n;iay :do are not binding on the judge. · 
Defendant;s · Certification of Voluntariness· 
I am· entering· this. pl~· ofm,y_ ·o_Wll fr~ :wi)J m,td·. cJioi®-: No force, threats, of ·un1awful 
·mflµ~,.Qf ~Y.k.4id ~v~ l?eeti. .. m?de to g~ ;me to., plead gmlty (or :110 co_ntesO~ 'N<i p:r9.ri:µs~ 
e~~Hhose contained hi this pleaigreemerit het,V.tfboo,il iriad~'fo.ine~ · · · 
. ihctv~ i~¢Jltl~ _$~fJ.Je~ent, .ci~ I-hav_e had it read to me by·an attom~y? and l µn,cl~and ,its 
co:iitenfs?and. adopt ,each·plea,agreement in it as my own. 1•jpiow .that I am free to. cnange,.or 
delete ·anything contained in this plea a~eement, but I do not wish to make any changes becaµs¢ 
ail of the statements :are correct. . 
r$.:~~n,ixfwifu the advice and assistance:of my attorney. . . · 
t.am. .-2.J_y~ars ~fig~. I have ~ended school through the. &~:wade~ :I_can·tead 
aJ1d µnd~s~d t}le E:ngli~ language. If I do not und~4 English, ~ iriterpteter:hcts been 
p1:9vided·to·.me~ :i·was-no.t.under th~ infh1~~e. of any ~gs, 'niedication, or.intoxicru,.ts w.hich 
·w.o.wd j:rnpa.ir my :j-qdgr.ri~t 1\'hen I decided. to plead guilty. I ~ 11dt . presei;itly under the 
'influence of any:dtug, medication, orfatoxicants wllich impair.my judgment. 
: I. believe myself to:· b.e· of sound and discerning mind . and to be n;i~~y gwapJ~: pf 
ui;ld~~ding these proceedings· and the consequences .of my pl~~ I ~ free of:: any meriW 
disease, ;-defect, od~pairmeri.t that ·wollld prevent me from underst~ding what I -~ 4oing or 
from. khowµigly, intelligently,· and voluntariiy entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty pleas(s), l can file a writte:o. mo.ti.on fo 
with.4.r.~w):r1y·pl¢a.(s) before sentence is annowiced .. Tunder~iarid ·fu..atfot'-a ple~ iil aheyance, a. 
motion to withdraw··froin the:pt~,agreeinent mtist be 'rn8,'Ae \vi.thin 30 days of pleading.guilty. or 
no ;QOµt~$1~_J,~ only b.e allow~d to 'withdraw ·my P,lea ifi show that it was noflo;1owingly· ~d 
Q: 
.Off0.0.57' 
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vol¢it@.yma4,~. l~ei"stari4:fu.at_.a11y· cb,alle;ige to ~yplea(s) ~~e:-~er SeiitencitJ_g'mUSt be 
pUISUed under the Post-Conviction1lemedies Ac.tin Title 78, '.Chapfor 35~ and Rule. (>SC Qf th~· 
Utah R\lles Qf,Civil Pr.9~edure. · 
Dated this ,,.....I ____ day of 1ime 
.!2·0·11·:·: . ·.· . ~.~ .·· .✓ ~~~ PE:fE@AN,T. 
.Certificate of Defense Attornev · 
I certify thaf.I am the attorney for Benjamin.DavidRettig;.thede.fendant above, alld.-f~atI 
know,J:ia/she;~•.~ea4 the plea agreement or'that ~ have read it to him~1#·; I 1*-V.¢ :~s¢~sed it.. 
with runi/h~·and believe that he/she fully illiderstands·the meaning-of its.contents and is 
mentally and physically ·competent To the best of.my'knowlec:lge.~d pe~¢f,: a.fig @-•approprlaie 
mvestigation,.th~ elem~ts of the ctjxrie(s)~d the facfualsynops~s ~f the defend~t'fcri,mmal 
conduct are correctly stated; and these~ along with the other representations an~ dec.l~ · 
mad~ by:the defendant-in the fotegoing affidav.it, are acettrate and 
Certificate of .ProsecutiilgAttomev 
I certify .that 1 am the attor.riey fo(the. :State pf V~:m the: case agam,st J3ehj~,Da·~i4· 
Rettig, tlie 9~(end~t. J have reviewed tliiip~ea,agreemen.t and:::find: that the: factual :basis of:the 
defenclani~s ;ciuninal conduct which· constitutes Jh,e:J>ff.em..e(s) ·is 'true -arid· co;rrect. :NoJm.p~pet 
irid,ucem¢iits, ~~ts, or coerciqµ. to encourage a plea ha$ ·been offered defendant The•.,piea 
negotiations are fully contained in this plea ·agre(mlent.or as· supplemented on th~;reqqr:d b~for~ 
the <2o~ Ther~is reaso~able.~use to pelieve that ~e evidence wo1,1ld support the ~n_victiot,1 of 
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/ate entered and that the acceptanc~ of the 
plea(s) would serve the p:ublic interest 
-· ' 
~.-·.··· .. ·.: . .;._..-.. '.··;·~ 
l ~·" OEPUTY UTAH;CODN1Y ATIORNEY Bar No. · j"C/6 t · · · 
ORDER 
B$ed on the facts set forth·:m-ihe,foregomg_plea f!gree~en.t ~d the·cerlin~atlori:of ~e 
d~feµdanfancl C9tlhSel; im.dbE1$ed "611 any pral representations in .c.ourt,: the Court witnes~~._the 
signatures and finds that the defendanes guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are.freely, lmowfugly, 
. : . •' ·. ·,·.,. 
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and voluntarily.made. 
IT IS liERE'.BY' ORDER.BP tb~thed~fei;idan.(s. ·gunfy (orntj COll.te$t): pl~( s) 'to the, 
crim~(~) .sef forth in .the.plea agreement-be: ae~tecland entered. ' .. ·•.··· 
Da~.tbis .;;L,. 'day.of ~ 
:if 
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1 GASE NO. 10110166.~ 
DEPT. AMERICAN FORK - #.2 
2 
3. 
fl: 
5 
6. 
IN. TI-IE :FQ9.1:(';i.'Il.· Dr$'1'.RIC'l' COUR~ Il;-1 :AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, . STA'I'E _OF ,UTAH; 
----00000-----
7 THE STATE OF 1J'l'AH, ). 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
8 
H 
10 
'VS. 
Plaintiff, 
TRANSCRI];'.T 
OF 
ENTRY OF PLEA 
BENJAMIN 'DAVID RETTIG, 
11 
J 
) 
) 
) 12 
13. 
:1_4 
lfr 
l _q 
Defendant. 
------------
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1 FOURTH DISTRICT COURT--AMERICAN FORK. 1 enters yourplea today? 
tJTAHCOUNTY,STATEOFUTAH · ·· · 2 2 THE: DEFENDANT: Yesj sit 
3 '·THURf-86'X:a~NE 2•·2011 3 ~E COURT: We'll Qo through thatin moredetaff in 
4 • ·,fr··~ 4 a rtjoment 
5 P RO C E E D I.N G ·s 5 Is. that th.~S}ateis und~rs~J:Kling of the agreement. 
6 ~ * * 6 Mr. Taylor'.? .. . . . . 
7 THECOURT: We1llcal1the.cas~ofStat~·ofUra~ 7 MR.JAYLO.R: Yes, it.~,J~Qge~ 
8 versus Benjamin Rettig. This is case 101101668. Jfcounsel 8 THE COURT~ Can ljust ask: you, Mr. Taylor. has th~ 
9 will please state their appearances for the record., 9 victim's family been consulted regardfrig.· this disposition? 
:10 MR. ESPLIN; .Mike EspHnJor the defendant, 10 MR~· TAYLOR: Y~. JiJdge~ T.fle:v~rn'$ vn.ctow is 
11 MR. FRAZIER: Stephen Frazier°Un~udi~~)~ 11 here. Darla Mortensen, and we.have also some·other exten.4.ed 
12 THE COURT: And Mr. Rettig Is here as weil?. 1~ family. We have talked with the.rn. :w.13:hwie taiked about Ulis 
13 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. .13 resolution, and the.y have been Onaudible)._ 
14 THE COURT: The State~ 14 THE COURT: Do'yoli know if :any of them desire to 
15 MR. TAYLOR~ Tn:nTayfor on b.ehat.fof theSta~e. 15 speak today in regards-not to any proposed senteooo.· 
16 MR. NIELSE_N: John Nielsen for the, state.~ 16 necessarily today but just in regards to the proposed plea 
17 THE COURT:. All_righ~ thank you. The C9urt's pE).en '17 ,agreement? All right, thank you~ 
1~ notified that the defendant inten~s to change his pie.a today; 18. Mr. Rettigi we1te going to :falldo. you now for some 
19 rs that correct,· Mr. Esplin? 19 moments here. if I could have the clerk administer an oath 
20 MR. ESPLIN: That's correct, Your-Honor 20 to you. Canwejustfree.hisrighthand•justforthe 
21. Onaudibie). 21 administration of the oath? If you'd like! itcould be 
22 THE _COURT: Would you like to proceed frqrp the ·22: resecured after the oath has been administered .. 
23 podium? :23· Can you raise your right hand, pfea$e. 
24 MR. ESPLiN: Yes. 24 111 
25 · · THE COURT: Who is going to state :the natur~ of th .25 Ill 
2 4 
· 1 ~greement?· Would yo~ like to or would you like Mt Taylor 1 V\/hereupon, 
·'2 to? · · 2 eef-lJAM1N RETIJG, 
•~ MR. ESPLIN: Sure, Your Honor. ·ws our 3 was administered the follqwing oath byth,e_c,qurtcfelk.: 
A: underst~ndfng that the State is going t~::~1e an Amencf~cl 4 THE. ~LERK: You do solemnly-swear that the· 
5 Information - weve received a copy of thaf"'."' which Wlll. 5 testimony you gi.ve. you're aboutto give in this case .now 
·. 6 result in the dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 to the lnformaNon: 6 pending before the 'court will be the truth, the whofe truth. 
7 and will allege count 1. criminal homicidi~ aggravated murder, 7 and nothing but the truth so help you God. 
8 and Count 2, aggravated kidn~pping, bQth first.idegree 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.-
9 felonies, one acapital felony, cine -a'fi~f~egre.~:~ro~y~: 9 .... ·•·. . . ... . TH; co4RT: Thank yotr Mr. Rettig, jtistto make . 
. 10 . . In addition to lh~t. the agree.m~nt WQti}c(ti~ ~fated '10 s~re you'r~l aware, ttie purpos·e. of the hearing· today ts for' . 
11 wiUt the plea ·stateme11t which has been prepared i_Q to!s case 11 you to enter a. ·guiliy piea - or guilty pleas to two·ofth~ . 
12 that the· State would. aisorecommend in return fodtie .12 State;s four charges against you. In order to. do th.is,: it'.s. 
13 defendant's pleas of. giJil~ to those lWo amended char9es 13 necessary that I confinn that you understand everythln.g 
14 wquld recomrnend thaHh.ey Wo~ld notseek. th¢' death' penalo/ In ·14 that's happening and all the consequences of your pleas 
15 this case and wouia· r.ecomrne·nd Ulafthe qefendijrit ~calve a ·1.5 today, If you. do not understand something; please just let 
16 penaliy of notl¢sftha'ri°2ij ye~rs. t~ l~_Wit)l;tb,e. . . . . . 1,6 me know, and I wili e~deavorto·ma.k~.:~ure:lliaf y9ti_~rf. 
17-. possibil,ity of p~rpl~:"il.aJ$QJecomm~~d.·thatthe.C.IJ~rge, o.f ·17 understand Jfi If you ever need.a defay or a chari~_.tp:~lk 
1 a· aggrav~ted murde.r and aggravated ,kidnapping run.co~~rr~ntly J~ .to your cou~sel .at any tirne, you can ·do .so there ~tJh~ 
19 with each other. And that's the basis of the agreement f9 podium orwe·~n t~ke.-~:recess.and you can talk in private. 
20 THE COURT:. All right, thank you.. 20 C.an I just.ask how old you are?· 
21 Mr.' Rettig, is that your understanding of. the 21 THE DEFENDANT~: I'm 23. 
22. ~greern,erit?. . . . . ·· ·22 THE COURT: And. how far did you go: in s·chool?: 
23 . . .THEO~Fl;NDANT: Yes~$i(. · ... ·.·.. . . 2$ THE DEFENDANT}. ,Finis~eclltle 11th grade~ 
24 . TH:E COiJRf: . -An.d.yo~)iridtn~fand tp~ ¢0.n~qu~o MR E.SPllN:. I-!·~ ~98$'have·~ G~p~ 
25 yoijr pie~ today if you do ~ccept'that offer an~ th~ .Court, 2s· THE COURT; How long hav~ y()u haq tiJ~tGEOJ 
~:(' }f3Ef.1:l ;COQK, • oi~, aPR . (4:~~l :~,6.EJ,-q.1)75 
i6l ?P~ID~N@UM~r CitY1. t/T '~:?7~9 
5' 
1 ·ntE DEFENDANT:. Since the 11th grade. .. . 1 . Mfl TAY.LOR:· Judge,.Qpunt 1, Ul~ aggraval.ed. m~f(fer, 
2 THE COURt:.: Arid you can·read and write the:Eng 2 ~?viously is Kay Mortensen.: Cou.l)t·z:~ agg~va~ 
3 language?· · 3 kidnapping, applles.ro·Roget'and'Pamela Mortensen. . 
4 .. -- . THE OEFl;NDANT: Yes, ~ir.. 4 . lHE COURT: So botll Roger'and:PameiaMortensen h! 
5 THE,.COU.RT:' Have YQU ta~en ~my alcofiol .or drugs i •. p b~11 included in CQiin.t2, i QU8$$. aritt: Count 3 Which would 
~ fhe·last 48 hours? 6 tel.ale 't9 another one is being dismis~~ Tha, is: ~o 
7 · : THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. . . . 7 classified as a first~egree felony.- The minfmurn penalty 
8 ;THI: COURT: :Any other medicine that could affect . 8 that attaches to this offen·se is presumed to be a prisoo·term 
· 9 your ability to qnderstand whatYoifarer doing today? 9 of not ress than 15 years and which may be for life. 
19 . . ·nte DEFENDANT: No, ,ir.~ 10 Howev~r •. if the CQurtfinds.'thala lesserterm is 
_i 1 . THE COURT: Do you currently have any .nie~tal; 11 io:the i~te.rest ~f ju$flce and if I state th~ reasons for .. : . 
1? emotional or physical problerl)s or issues that could interfere J2 thal.ffhdilJg on the record, tJ)en I coukf impose a tenn of 
1~ wtth your ability fo'understand what is happening here today? 13 imprisorurient:of not fess than ten·years and which may be for 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No. 14 life'and of nofless than six years which may be for life. 
15 THE COURT: :Has anyorie forced, ttireatenedot 15 (Off-the-recoro bench conference.) 
16 ¢arced you in any\vafinfo entering these pleas that are: 16 . . . l}IE. COURT: . rAr. Reffi.g, your·counsel has requested 
:17 pi'Qposed)9~ay? . . - . . . 1.t a briefrecess'lo look. at the potential penalties for 
18 THE QEFENDJ\Nr: N<>, . . . 1~- ~ggray~te4 kidoapping. Welll do that. and ~nvene as soon 
19 THE COURT:., .· }fas any~n~ made any p_romrses ,tQ yo . . as we're ready., . . . 
20· connection With·your guilty pleas-other than tttose· that 20 (Whereupon, a recess was .taken~). . 
21 Mr. ·Esplin has already stated on thetecord? 21 MR.ESPLIN: We believe that the Court is correct 
22~ · · 11:f~J>EF'=NDANT: Nt>~, . . . . . .· . . . . 22 onJh~t ~ing the s.tatu~, ~nd we ~av~ modiJl~ the statement 
2~ THE, ~OU~T: . Are you, in• fact. intending to enter· 23 of ev~nts t9 allege m~imum, penalty is fife wjthout par9le or. 
24 ·-these.pleas of your ownJree win and choice? 24 15 years to fife. I've explained ·that t~. the defendant, and 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 25 I've explained that the Court can in· this·case (inaudible) 
6 8 
1 THE-COURT:·. -.fave you had' an opportunity to clearl 1 appropriate six or tenJears. 
2 disCllss this plea ·$gr¢emeotwilh:Yoot ~tt0,rrieys? 2 · THE COURT: Thaok'you-:A.n.g yo~\1e initiated that 
, 3- . . °THE.DEFENbANif i have~ . . . - . 3 ch~:ng'e orf that document Mr. Rettig?' . . 
4 THE COlJRT: .. And you understand lhe terms ofth~t ·. 4 . - . . . THE DEFENDANT: ·1 have •. 
5 agreement? . '• .. . .. 5 THE COU.RT: , Do you. understand then the penalties 
6 · THE DEFENDANT: Yes. . .. . . . 6 for ihe offense of aggravated kidnapping? Should I go over 
7 ·THe COURT:: in· Count 1 of the Information, you hav 7 those again'- Mr. Esplin, or do .you think that.he --
8 been ~arged ~ and I und~tan_d even in the Amended a MR. ESPLIN: I think he understands. Do you 
-~. informa.tio~•y~u wiU :~~ ~h~rgeqwith ~ggravateq murder which 9 understand? 
1(l i~cJ~~s~ed·:a$· a no.nc.a·pna1:~rsf.:C,~ree feiony under the 10 THE pEF~Nb!W(: I cfp. 
U . · Jaws of.the s..~te. o(O.tah. because :a notice of intent to seek 11 . . . . . 'UIE courm The pre$umptic~Q i:r15 tq tif~. but, It 
1.2· the death penaityhas nofyetbeenfifed. The minimum· 12 could be highe_r; couid be.towet.. . 
13 penal~ that applfes· to: this offense ·isJiil indetenninate 13 r understand that ttiEfState has :agreed lo recommend 
14 prison term of not ress ·than 25 years artd which may be for 14 a senteli® ~f 25 yea~ to nre:in 'excha.nge tor your guilty 
1.s·· !if~::pij~ ffi.e· rn~im~m penaltyfs liftf'itl prlsoriWithout 15 pte~ t<>#99fcl~~.t~ rri_urder. n atscf agrees to"recommen~ that 
16: pa~r~~ . . . . . . . . . 16 tne· senteii~ oi'i the ~ggtava.ted .kidnapping charge should run 
1J D~ YOl$ und~rstan~. {hartti,e;$ are' t~~ P9$~iijle 17 current with _your ~enten~ f9r aggraya.ted murder. 
1 ~ · penijlije$ th9t ~U?~h · t<>'toe offense Qf :agg~~ied rnu~er as 18 Finally, I understand l~at you agree· lhatif you . 
f8 · · cl)rr~nily ·i;h.arged agai(Jst you? · 19 · _are sµbpo~naed Jo.t~tify in a proceeding ~ga.inst Martin B_ond 
20 THE DEFEN.DANT: Yes, str. . .· ,. 20 thatyo~woufd appear arid testify truthfully in that 
• 21 THE COURT: Count 2 of the Information ane~es.iha ;21 ~toceedin9. · . · .. 
22 you have:comrnitled the· offense of a~gravated lddn·apping: I'm 22 ls this your understanding· of the plea agreement? 
23 info·rmed,:~ndWhen·we he hear the factual basis in a few· .. 23 THE DEFENDANT:'· Yes/sir: -
24. ~pm~n~,'.ihat that ~!ales to Roger ~nd Pa~ela - I'm sorry. :24._ . . ·. . . W,EO◊URT: In addition to thQse penalties we've 
25:'the cme:count address~s·both; isthc1t correct, Mr. Taylor? 25 disC.µ§~e<i/yo,u ro.~yalsobe_ordered to pay a fine o_f up to 
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·1 : $101090 for each offense/a so ~rcent sutchargrf and a ~3 
2 courtsecun""•·tee •. 1 atsoma· ·oroet" au to · · iestitutio_ rt' 
·" .:·.· • ...... .... •.,1. ·: ... :·:_ .. - .... y .. , .. , .. Y: .. · · ... ~~: ... . 
3'. to the victfins of your crime;_dQ yo.u und~tand that? 
1 MR. ESPLIN: Ifs there. 
2 THE.COURT: And it's an aftemate there? 
3 MR,-,TAYLOR:. Yes; YQOrH~Mt 
4· THE DEFENDANT: ·tes, $ir. . 
5 . . . THE COURT:, ·1 want' to go through the eiem~o~ c>f 
6 . the offenses with you now. The elements· of 1he offense of 
4_ tHe couRT:· .As rafas iheadmrsston 01 the 
, 5 agreemeQt.then °tQday~_are\l!e· ~-reelng tiia.t tl)e.:defend~nt is 
6 only admitting to 2 a'n~ 3 or-to the fncidenf,to attempt.to 
7 commit aggravated kidnapping and pecuntary ·gafn? Is that 7 aggravated murder as has been· charged against you in the 
• 8 Information are as follows:: That 'first .on or ·aboi.lf 
9 ~overnber 16th, 2009, in Utah County,-llta~. yotfcaused the 
1 O death of Kay Mortensen and, second. that you did_ so 
11 intentionally or knowingly and, third.- that the.homicide w~s 
12 committed incident to an act, scheme, course of condµct or 
13 criminal episode during which you committed or attempted to 
14 commit aggravated robbery1 robbery. aggravated burglary or 
15 · burglary, aggrav~ted kidnapping or kidnapping. Here I_ gues$ 
16 the applicable other offense would be aggravated kidnapping. 
17 The homicide· ... ifs also alleged that the homicide 
18 .· may have been or was committed for pecuniary gain -
-· a what ttie State is doirig today? I thoiig~Ohe. .fact~al basis 
· 9 would support all three, and that's ill th.e.,etem~nts Ui~t. you 
10 have, provided to met ~o I'm mentioning ~U,°~ree~ 
11 Just for the recont Mr~ Esprt.~ .. whe~ you were 
1i .. referring to 2 and 3. you're referring.to how-'~ey're 
13• numbered on the statement of events·and·not how they're 
14 numbered by statute: · 
15 MR.·E~~UN: .No, the statu~·vn~_~dibte). 
ts MR. TAYLOR; Our argurnen(is that itJ not 
17 necessarily with regal'.(f s to subs 2t 3 and 4 that he'$ 
18 admitting all of those because those.are in 4. 
19 THE COURT: Right, and I understand:-19 pecuniary is just another word for monetary; that there·was 
20 · some sort offinancial motive for it- or that the h.omfcfde. 
2'1 was. com_mitted ·in an especialiy hem~us,''atrocious~ cii.f el or 
22 exceptionally_df;?prave~ mannef,,any of whic~.must be 
20 M~-: TAYLOR:·: s~ it would just ~e showing that he 
21 did It ·itj ~njunction with Mark Bond hthis way or in th.is. 
23 d~onstrated by physical torture, serious·p~ysical abuse or 
24 .serious bodily injµry to the victim before .death. 
25 Do you understand that these are the· elements of 
10 
2~ otherway,_and so that_would be- ~at's o~r argumenl so: 
23: we1re not saying he necessarily dfd it, but that would be 
24 part of what we're ·proving so that he1s not admitting th'e 
25 efemenls with regards (inaudible) 4. 
12 
1 the Qffense of aggravated rn1:1rder as it h£ts been charged . 1 THE .C()URTf .. I understand if you went to trial you'd 
2 again~·yQ~? . . . . . . 2 wanU<? have an th~ th_eories··go to a jury, but this is an 
3 .. . . .. .MR! ESPLiN: Your J·fonor, wewould indicate that 3 agreement, and_ so I anticipal$ff - and I guess I s_houfd ~ave 
4 Mr; .Rettig would be charged µn~~r-the intentionally ·aiding · 4 confirmed tllat eartier - but I anticipated that there was an_ 
5 another person to commit homicide. His· involvement is as _an . 5 agreement to {!lose three aggravating factors.even though they 
·.5 accessory here) ·and he Uildetstands that as an accessory he is 6 are 11or" under the statute. You only need one of 1hem. 
7 liable as ifh_e were (in~tidible).. 7 MR ESPLIN: ffs prob~ry,~¢adernic:~xceptit 
·a, THE COURT:, fdidn1t see a reference -to 76-2--202 or . 8 concerns us .about the sentencing ~itµ~~QO alth~ugh 
·g· the party liability statute iffil.je_statemer(· .. · ... ·. -. . .. . .... -~ (inaudible) sent~nce·(inaudible):a{fec(Qn~udi~fe)~ 
10 •·· . MR. ESPLIN: Th~t's come- that's in the· facb,lal 10 . THE COURT~ It may. twanUo r.nake ~~re w~ have an 
11 statement. He was n9t the actual one that killed. Also, I H agreemenfas to the erement'even thoughJhe statute.is "or." 
12 don't kriow that Section 4 Qnaudibfe} for the death penalty 12 By nowWe.ought to have an agreement to the elements that 
t3 or'capital homicide, but I think the State is really going 13 we'(e. pl~a.dm.g· fo~. Def you. rieed. rnore.·Mme.? 
14 uriderthe No. 2 and No. 3 there. ·•· . . . . 14. . •. · .. M~ftAn.Qrt. Judg$,lthin~~:at.-V.,hat.we'll~o.is 
f 5 MR. TAYLOR: If it were toJjo to trial, We wouid 15 that we'd be °fine with regards ·to tl)e elem.~nfs: tf Mf. ~eft.ig 
16. try to u~~ any one· .of.lho$e ·categorie$, but. I think . . 16 ad.mils to subp~~graph fand'$ whrch ·sho~ th~ e.J.ements-
17 Mr. Esplin is rigot that thafs kind of Qna·udi~{e)~ _fihink 17 (ina_udible) •. _ . . . . . . . . . .·· 
18 our factual basis~ you koow, ·mosUy a~heres to 2 and ~·- ifl 1ti' ]JiE CPURT:· Is th~t your ag~m(1fi¼.Mr. Esplin? 
19 our statement of defendanf s plea under ihe element of the 1'9 . MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I think thafnufficient to 
20 offense, we do include intentionally aiding another;person, 20 support the pfea: 
21 so either he did it or he Intentionally aided anotlier person_. 21 · THE COURT: Any_ of the three are sufficient to 
22 and so we did include Jhat in our statem~11l 22 sµpJ)Qtt:~~ pie~. You ·have 'the e>.rigfnar document in front of 
23 THE COURT; In th~ facts~ . 23 you, Mr. ~~plinfis tMt lig~t? . 
24 MR TAYLOR: If you look 9fl page 2. . 24: . MR. .ESPLIN·: Thet@'goil.lgto, ~,~ ~o l\meri~ed 
25.·. THE cou·RT: Under NQ;·11 · 2s :into.nnaijon. 
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1 THE COURT: ·1 mean the·statement of events. 1 intentionally and knowmg~ Mt Mortensen's ·death incidentto 
2 MR. ESPLIN: Ye$~ l cfo/(oQi"Hooor: 2 tnoselwo a· · ravatin ·. factors; that those are tne:·erements of 
3 1r1e•¢guRt~·: lfyo~ ~~~~ -m~ke ·a notation ·there- 3 ~gg~v~ie<l~ij?ct~r;~:·lt'hif~en :i:h~rg~ ~gai~sfyij_u? 
~-- then. 4 THE tlEfENDANT;' Y~, sri:' . . . . .. 
5 Mfl. ESPLJN: filiju~tstnl<e 4.then. . . . 5 TI-IE··couRT: The elemerits:ofthe.offefl$~()f 
6 . . ii-ie· COURT;;: And ~y~u ~uld intti~IJhat ~ndh~ve 6 ~99rava~l<f4n~ppiog as it has been_.Qharged:~gafilstyou·in 
7 ·Mr. Rettig initial thatand·anow Mr/Taylor to inftialthat. 7 ttte·lnformation ania~~.llows: First that:on or about 
8 I'm riotsu~. M~. Taylor, if this level of minutiae a November" 16,:2009( inUtah County~ Utah, during the course of 
_9 .-9rde~ilfwasdi~~Usseij\Yltht1i.~vicfim's famify. 9 bommittfngtinfawful'detention·orkidnapping, you.did either, 
10. ... lA~ rAY.i-9~;' _l(w.a~, ii.Qt Judge. We talked ~ore 10 ~cond, possess, us~'or tteat_ei1 to use a dangeroU$ weapon as 
11 . geoerally with regams ic;, the efem~nts. not particul~rfy with 11 defined.in U~h Code ·section. 76-1.-601 or, tJ:tir4, act with . 
12 · regards to go1ng· .through eve~. statutory [Inaudible) as to 12 _intent to facifttate the comm~ion, ~~ropted commission 9r 
13 -· what theory we would proceed. . . 13 flight after commission·or attempted co_mmission of a felony. 
14 THE.COURT: Whicit enhancements would bErnsed. H4 hinder or delay the discovery or reporting of a •teiony or, c. 
15 Want to. mwce sure _s1nce Jhars at least for me .a changeJn 15 _inflict .bodily injOI)' onor to terrorize a victim or another. 
1~ what l~~;:~~ri. in'~~ ·doc.urn.e~'ts here· that there's still. no . . 16 . · S_afl1~ question there, Mr. Espl~n, Is there an 
17 desi~,. on _th_e p~rt of the victims to make a statement today 17 ijgreem.ent_as to which of tho$_e aggravating factors Qr all of 
18 · regarding th~ prea agreement. 18 them .woQki:,apply? ,-: .· . _ . .. . . . . . .. . 
19 ···(Pause in proceedings.) 19 MR ESPLIN: l think theywould alrapply, Your 
2~ MR .. TAYLOR: Just for the record I spoke with Dada 20 Honor. · · 
21 M~rt~~~en and eXplained to her the amendment taking place on 21 ... ·. . ..... THS CQ~RJ: lf.sJ04r un~~tstanding then. 
~: 1J'.lafand w_~•.r~ ready to ·g9 forwar~ and proceed. . . . 22 ~f~ ~e~~ _fhatyoirr&-~d~itting· to ail !flr~ of those 
~~ . . . THE COURT: If I might just comment I understand 23 ~ggravating factors today;:is that right? 
24_ that in, some ways th[$ e_f~ent 1s a difficult one even under 24 l11E DEFENDANT: Yes. sir. 
25 · these facts to establish because I don't know what evidence 25 THE. COURT: Do you understand those elements of 
-14 16 
, 1· the State has regarding hoW tong Mr~ Mortensen lived; You 1 aggravated kidnapping as l'Ve explained that to you? 
2 ~·eedJ9 also unde·rstahclthatfrs· probably the element with 2 · · THE DEFENDANT:: · 1 do. 
3· . the mosteriioifonaJ impact and the most reJe'vance to· the 3 TH1:·¢0QRT; . Rijarciing the assisfarici!°'of your 
4 ·victim's. family as:it rerates to ·suffering of so·m~one who w~s ·4 ~unst!f riow,Jm go{rig l9 ·as~ you first of all, ·rve asked 
.5 dying. So l underst~nd the difficulties today. I also 5 Y<?U before, but you hav~_-had a ·~an~·to discuss the entering 
8 understand the legal issues that the· attorneys are involved 6 of your plea with your-attorneys today?· 
7 ini and ifs a complicated one; and if you need more time, 7 . THE DEFENDANT: I' have~ 
a I'~ h~ppy to ·give it, but yoµre ready to proceeq? . · a WE ~OYRt _ Afl~_previo~sly to today,? 
9· . MR TAYLOR: We'ie ready to proceed. Ju~ge. Tfia. k$ THE t>EFENDANT: l have. 
·,..• .. ,;.,. ·.• . ' . 
1.0 you. .. . . , . . . . . . . . . . 1_() . . THE C9URT: You·had an adequate opportunity to 
f1 . THE:co.URT: · Ail righ(thank you. Let m,e just go 11 · spend ti~E3 with them so they coutd answer all of your 
12dh(ough lh~tone.more.lime·.with you. · . · . 1i questions? .. . . _ . . _ .,
13· Mt. Rettig, as far as the·courtistoncemed then, 13 THE'bei=ENDAAT:- Yes, sir. 
'14 the reason· this itfan-aggravated murder is because the 14 THE COURT: Have your attomeys answered all of 
1 s homicide \va~- comm.ltted "incident t<>" one act, scheme; course of 15 your' questions?· · 
16 conductofciiminal·eplsode"dunng which you committed or 16 . THE DEFENDANT: Yes,:sir~ 
1t ~tt~pt~d. tcfcommif aggravated ~idnapping, ~nd :the homicide 17 . . . . THE_ CO~R!: fw you fully satisfied With the 
l~ · was·committe~ (Qr pecuniary gain~ ·so instead <>f being "c,r' 1~ counsel ~nd· representation and advice that they\le given to 
19-' there~we'tJroonsidering that you1re adrrittHng tQ both of 19= ypuJn·this C8$e? 
20 thos~ aggravating factQrs; is that your understanding as. 20 nte·oEFENDANT: Yes, sir. . 
21 \Yell? 21 THE.:COURT: My understanding is thaf the attorneys 
22 THE ~EFENDANT! Yesl sir. 22 have. been Stephen Frazier, Ann Boyle and Mike Esplin? 
23 .·. . . THE.:C_OU.RT::· Doyou understand thattheseelemen ~3 · rHED,J;f,~NDANT: Y~sir. 
24-: ~l~~'Vtfgqi,i~Jh_toµgh}hem t~is morning with the bfe~k.th~t 24 . T~E:~0.U.RT: DqyQU need any ad~iUonal tjm~ t~ 
~5•, ~ifha.ppel\e~ o~ C>t'~bout November 16,.2009i-t~at you .caused 2~ confetwi~ theijl? 
MM,Y. BET~ c.oo~, cit .~P:~ (4$5) 8~8~1_(!75 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: No. sir. . 1 with J11nrancf(inaudible)fovestigation prior to having piea. 
2 TH~ COURT:: :Now~-•~arding.the.prea statement; i·2 discussions. · · · 
~ °)'Qtl've had a c,t~hce to.'read thafplea document there in front 3 THE COURT: so.you've uncovered addfHonaf evidence 
4 of yqu? · · · 4 that he~sbeen able<to'fevie_w?· 
5 THE DEFENDANT: i have~ 5 ... , . ·., ~_ijJ$PµN_;: ··yes. . .. . . .. 
6. THECOl)RT:: .V<>.µ'v.e. read·tt:~ntirely pa~grap~ by 6 THE C0~8T: _.All right Qe>yqu b~~Je~. Mr~ Esp.Ii~. 
7 para9raph? . . . ._ .··· , . = • • . , . . ., · t that there•s _a factuai basis for the$8:lW.o. pt.eas.? 
8 . THE DEFENDANT: Ye$. sir. 8 MR. ESPLiN: I do.. . 
-9 THE COURT: Did you have anyone read it to you, o 9 THE COURT: •And do you believe, Mr. Esplin;that 
10 did you read it yourself? . . .10 your clie.nt liriderstan~,:th~ 90n~nts Qf th~ pfea agreement 
1 j MR! E$P_llN: ~oth~ H~ ~d.it himself. WeJe.~ a 1 t arid the consequen~ of.his pie~~ today $Swell as the 
12 copy~ andh~i$had a ~pyfor_~evera·lw~eks. . . 12 constitutional rights thafwould be w~ived? · 
13 THE DEFEN.DANT: I've read lt multiple times. . . 13 MR.. ESPLIN; ·ves. . , .· . _ 
14 MR-ESPLIN: We've also discussed It in•detailwith 14 THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, i'm still going to."go over 
15 him (in,audibl~k 15 with you justonelasttime~ This will b.e.th~ la~ttime that 
1~. TH.I; C.Qt)RT:. You've reviewed that document yours tt6 you will ~av~ those rights ~xplained t~ you .. '(p~~ read 
17 men when you've had it over_ the last e9upl~ of weeks ~ 17 them. You've had your attorneys explain tpe~ to you, ~nd ~ow 
18•.: elements Qf ~ggravated n,urqer and th~ elemen~ of aggravated 18, this will be the. last a.n~ that will occ;µr b.efc)reyou,r ple~,is 
19 kidnapping as ,ve've discussed them today? 19 entered. Please listen carefully _lo .what f tetf yQtJ and:t~: .. 
20 THE DEFENDANT: I have.: 20 my questioosa.nd be sure tQ let me know iftll~re'sanything 
21 THE COURT:: You've also had ·a chance to revlew fo 21 that you do not understand .. If you need to talk to your 
22· those lapl couple of weeks the possible: penalties lhat would 2.2 attorney again, yo!) may ~o so in ·private or~ete ·at u:ie 
23 attach? · 23 podium. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yest sir.. 24. YQu have the. right to plead not guilty in thi$ case 
25 THE:CQURT: Have.you been made aware Qf the 25 and to have the case tried through a speedy and public.b'fal 
18 
1 eviden·ce the .state;wotild present againsryou in this case· if. 1 before an impartialjury arid an unbiased juiy; do you 
. 2 ft vje~t tq ·tn~I?. •.. . ·• .. . . :2 iinders~nd this :~ght? 
3 tHE,p~f.1:NDA'~J: ~.have! ... . . . .... ·· 3. _· .. ·. ··- MFti.ESP.llff ·onern~~er~ W~;h.afa pr,efimi~.afy 
.4 THE COlJRT;;. · Based ~po~ Ute evid~~ theSta.~.W- utl hearing. explained it to the defendant, and he has not Wpived 
;:5 fntrodu~ ~ttr.ial, 4o.. y~u bellev~ tha·~ th~~•s a substanti~i · · 5 that as yet. . We have explained that there's: a preHminary 
~ chance that if the jury Qe"!ieved the State's evidence you · 6 hearing set in this matter an.d that ~e has a right to . 
7 would be found guiltrofboth aggravated murder and -7 preliminary hearing, and he needs to waive lhafbefore the 
8 aggravated kidnappin_g? 8 Court 
~ THE DEi=ENDANT; Yes, sit.:· ·... .· . . .. · · ... ·9 . . . . THE.COURT:: Wetrartdotpatnrst: Mr. Rettig,you 
,q· TifE COµRT: H~~fyop(~Uomey~ re~ew~<J_w,~ yo Jff do have the ng~t foipreliminary hearing ~s W~rt. One I$ . 
-~.1 the rights whi~h ar~ s~tfort~.in iheple~·s~tement ·those. 11 ~urrently.setfor July ill which the_Gourtwould m.ake an .. 
12 cooslltutional rights to a trial? . . . 12. independent detennination based on the evidence proyjde_d by 
13 THE DEFENDANT: They'have.. 13. the State ·as to whether or not there is probable cause)o 
14.: THE· COURT: Do you need anymore time to talk'to 14 warrant your continued prosecution on this case; ln other 
15 them about those rights? . · . .. · · 1 s· words·. whether ofn·ot there's'probabre cause to warrant 
16 THE O.EFENPANT.: N~. sir. . . .. . ·1a· ,contiri~lng t~ward~·trial. Jf.you warve t~at rt,gh~ thenw~. 
17 .. . THE COURT~ · 1•11 ask you agai~~ l'm,sure yofh~v~. 17_ will fi~d that there ls piobable·cau~e, ~hiqh W.ifl bfa.v~if 
1~--- Mr.'Espli_n, t,µt hav~:you _reviewed the evi~ence in this case. 18 shortfinding l;leca~se we \Yill soon. here~fter fin,d.tfi~t 
19: with Mr. RetUgt _ .. ·.. __ . . . . 19 there1s· beyond ~, reasonable dou~i or that yoµ ~ave admitted 
20 MR.-ESPtiN:.: Yes,-.on several occ.asions. Y~mr Hono 20 these.offenses, but you'd also waiveyour..righ(to a 
.-; 21 we have discussed the.evidence arid the implication of the ·21 detennination of probable cause by.this ·court Js .it your 
~~· ~vide~.a,3.: . . . . . 22 desire tcfwaive th~f rightt9'prelimiriafyhearin9 in this 
2~· _ : . · T~E:c.9y~Tt ,:~~-~~'$ ~are Qfyotit:a.l l~a~t 23; case? · · •. · · · · 
i4.· interpreJ~µon of .mat ev,~~o:~?. . . .. 24. . THE/DEF.ENOANT:: Ye.s. $ir~ 
25 .. . MR~ ~.$P.LtN:: . W~'y~ also had our investigator meet 2s· THE.~90..RT~ · ....M~: ~~-: ~~s~n.~~ril$:l9 th~fWaivef/ 
~lr ~ET,T:'f.: cooK, .c;lt. RPR (~35.). .eGti;..~otS: 
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· 1 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir,.we do. 1 pr~ui:nptton of innocence and-tbatyou would tia~ no 
2 . MR. NiELSEN: Just priotto the Court's going over· 2 obligation to prove 'your fnnocence·because· you:·are presumed 
3 this is w~~oticed omHbing on .. Ql~etern.ents of aggravated 3 to- be filnocen¼ do:you un~etstand lh~f rlg~t1-
·4 ~idnappftjg~ The .firsfqne th~f tfieiCoµrt would ·nottfln th~ 4 . lHE: DEf,E_NDANT: Yes, sir~ . 
5 course Qf committing unlawful detention "pr"Ridnapping'that 5 _ lli;. CQURT; . po you understand _t11at if a trial Were 
6 obyiously shourq indud_e the efemen\s of ~~napping ~s wen 6 ~~d IJl~ State would ~ave to prove ~ach of the elements of 
7 since they were delineated in the statem~nt That's· under 7 ·the offenses: ofaggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping 
8 7~:.301~ An actor commits kidnapping if the actor 8 beyond a reaso·nable-doubt before yot:r courd be found guilty of 
9 intentionally or knowingly~ without authority of law~ and 9 these offenses? .. 
10· •sain~tthe will of the victim·: {a) detains orresirains the 10. .. , . 1HE-.Dl:R:.NDANT:· Yesi ~ir~ 
11. vfctfrnJor any substantial period of time: {b) detains or . 1'1 . . iH_e: CQYRT:' If.a trial were held before a jury, the 
1-~ restrams ~e viclim in circumsta~ces .~xposi~g the victlm·to 12 ~relict WO\Jif ~ave to_ be unanimous~ meaning that each juror 
t3 risk of-b~ily injury. We befieve those would be the ones· 13 would have to find you gtiil{y"beyond a reasonable doubt 
14 that apply in this case. 14 before·Y.t>u coufd be.convicted; do you understand this? 
15 . MR. ESPLIN:• We:haVe"discussedthoseetementsw, 5 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
16 · (Ile defendan{a~part of oµr QnaudiblE!). :1 s THE COli8T: Do you. understand tf1at by' pleading 
17 .. . tHg COURT: . Mr." ReUig, did you hear that 17 guifly.y9u give up tlJe pr~tnnption of innocence, and you will 
1a- detm,eation ofthe elef'l'.le_nts of kidnapping? 1~ ~ aqmitti~g to~ prlm~s of aggravat~d murder and 
19 :TH~-DEFENDANT: Yes~ sir. ._ . . .. 1~ aggravatedl9d~c1pping? . 
20 THE COURT: And you understand the elements wo rl0 . THE DEFENDANT: Yes;-Sif. 
21 n~lo be proven against you on that count? 21 THE COURT: You have·an· absolute right tcHeniain 
22 . THE DEFENDANT: Yes~ sir. 22 ~Hent an..d yo4 can·oot b~ compel!~ to irtcrim.i~a_te you~elf 
23 THE COURT: _Thank you~· Mr. Nielsen. 2~ or to- provlde evi~~ri-~ agai_~st y9ij~eJf. Ari" iiicriininating . 
24. · . . . Back to y~ur right to a $peedy and pu~lic jury 24 ~tatement_ fs ~ sta~rnent:wijich Y/O\lkl ten~ to ·connect you with 
-25· trial before an impartial and unbiased jury, do you 25 the commission of the.crfmes. Do you understand that you 
22 24 
.1 understand thatnght?. 1 have an absolute rlghtto:remain· sileniand that you cannot 
:2 THEDEFENDANT: I.do. 2 btrmadeto iliciimiriateyoi.Jtselri . 
;3 THE;COURT::: Although yo~ have ~e ijgh{to b~ bi . 3 THE DEFENDANT:. I d.o•: 
4 by-a jury, Y9U foayaiso :have a·judge·declde·your:castfin.stead, 4 i'Hf::COURTZ In addition~ ify~u choose to remain 
5 of a jury iflhe prosecution and tl)ejudge agree to that. If· 5 sile~~ youf silence cannot be used against you at trial. and 
6 a judge .were to decide your caseJ · the judge would also have 6 theJurors Will be told that they 'COUid not hofd your 
7 to· be an impartial and unbiased court or judge:· do you 7 decision not to· testify against you; do you ·understand this? 
8 understand that right as well? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes; sir. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 9 TffE COURT: Do you ·understand that a plea of guilty 
10 tHE COURT: ·vou understand thatffyou have atria 10 is an admission of all the facts which would be necessary to 
11 _ yQu h~YQ a right to be represented by an attorney throughout 11 estabfish your guilt at· biai? _ 
12 those· proceedings,:a·nd if you cannot afford one, on~ would be 12 THE DEFENDANT: N es,$i(, 
13 appoititecno represent you. Votive been appointed the 13 THE COURT: Because-a ptea of guilty admits all 
14 assistance of Mt; Espfin, Ms. Boyle and Mr. Frazier, ah'd they 14 facts necessary to establish guilt itis an incriminating 
15: ciinfinue to be:your attonteys through fciday; is that correct? 15 statement • Do you understand thatby entering a· plea of 
16 . . THE DEFENDANT: Yes,_sir. _ .. _ . __ 16 gu1ItyJoii91ve·upyourrightto remain·snent?- . 
fl THE.COURT: lfyoudo not plead guilty.you ate 17 . THe··oEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
18" presumed to be innocent until the State prQves that you are 1 a THE COURT; Although you h~ve a righ(to remain 
19 guUty of aggravated murd~r and aggravated kidnapping. If 19 :¢1letjt. ifyQu wer~ to have a trial yQµ wo.u.fd h.ave a tight to 
~o. yottchoo~e to fight or contest th~~1a ~tiarges_ against you, you · _20 ·1e$tify in your own behalf if you wished to·do so; do you 
21 rieetl"only plead not guilty and your case wm go to trial; 21. understand that right? . 
22· you understand that? 22 THE DEFEN_DANT: Yes, sir._: 
23·. THE.DEFENDANT: l do~ 23 THE COURT: If you were·to have a trial, you would 
24. _ ·THE COURT: 1You. un~~rst~n.d Plat if a trial were 24, have·a righUo confront and ·cross-examine any witnesses 
~5 held the S~tewould have the burd~n of overg>ming the 2$. whlcti·m"ay "ie~~ against you. This r.neans that your 
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·1 attorneys would be; able to. ask each witness questions while 
2 the wilne$s js in open court and in your pr8$e.n.~·an~ utid~f 
. 3 o~th. Do you underst~nd th~t you ~~e this iig.hfl . . . 
4 THE ~EFEND~T: Y~s, sir. . 
: 5 THE COURT.; You also ,have a rightto pr~s~t 
.6 evktence·and. to ~n,pel witnesses t() appear i.n.courtlQ 
.7 testify for you; This means that you would be entitled to 
8 obtain subpoenas requiring the atteMance and testimony.of 
Q those witnesses, and that if you could notaf.forct:t~ P~Y:for 
10: the witnesses to appear the Stat~ woiM pay ijlgse co~ts '.fot . 
~ 1 you. Do you. understand that you hav~. this righ,t? · 
12 . · THE DEFENDANT: Yes, s'ir .. 
13 THE COURT: If a judge era jury were to find you 
14 gui!ty, you would have: a right 10 appeal youfconViction to · 
15 the Utah Supreme Court. ln addition, youwoufd have the 
:16 right tp have an attorney assist you in that app_eal~ If you 
1:7 could not. afford the cost of the appe_af1 the, State. woufd theg 
;1a pay tbose costs for.you. However, when you e,ntera pf~ of 
19 guilty, you admit your own guilt. Having admitte~ yourguilt-
20 in this court, you cannot. CC?ntest your own ,tatement of guilt 
21 on appeal; do you ~nders~nd (ni~? 
22 THE.OEFENOANI: Yes. sir~-
2~ . . Tl:{1; COURT: Fin~!iy, doyou und_erstandtn.atby 
2,4:. · entering a plea of guilty .yo." giy~. up :all .of the rights whi~ 
25 we have just discussed as well as the rights set forth in the 
26 
1 plea statement?. 
·2 THE DEFENDANT: Yet sit-
3· THE COURT: rn •riow discuss puefly ,with you tt,te 
4 consequences of entering a guil(y p1$a. D_o you .. ~n~erstan~ 
5 that by p_leading gu_ilty to agg~vated. _mur.cfer and .aggravated 
6 kidnapping you will be_subjectin.g_youl'.5elf to serving 
7 mandato,y penalties for these crimes? 
8 THE DEFENDANT; I do. 
: 9, . Tij_E:COU~T:· Your sen~ence ~iJI i~9tti~t) a _priso~. 
1 O . terin and· may_ also 1nclucfe a fine;. do you understand thl~? 
11 THE DEFENDANT:_ Yes, sir..: 
12 . THE COURT: ln .addition to :the fine, a 90 percent-
13: surcharge may be or will be imposed, and yoo may also be 
14 ordered to make restitution for your crlme;.do you understand 
15. that? · 
16 .'. , .. , THE- DEFENDANT: Yes~ siri:-
.. ··. · .. :·.• :'" .,.; .· ... ·,.-... ,.·:: 
17 .• THI; COURT: Bt;!caus~ you1lf bf) pl~M,~gJq __ tw~ 
18_ offens.~, the.._$ent~nces tbatwill beimposed.f~r~a~h.cri,n,e 
}9 may run concurrenlly ,or consecutiveiy, that is, one after the 
20 other. and concurrently is at the same tirne or 
21 simultaneously .. It is within the Court's discretion to 
22 decide,. Whether ifs a concurrent-.orconsecutiVe sentence 
23 regardJess pf any piea agreementthafyou h~ve-enter~ into 
24 with the ~ta~; do_ you \JOq~rstari~ this? . . 
2~: . THE ·01:FENDANT: Yes, sir •. 
1 THE COURT: Are you on probation at parole at this 
2 Qr.n.e? 
. 3 TH~ P~~NOANT~- ·.N,o.Jm 110,l _ . . . . _ .... 
4 THE.-POlJ_RT: . And-th~ ~e w~s.notco,nrt1itted while 
$ you were on probation or parole?_ .... . . 
6 TH.E DEFENDANT:; (No audible respo.ns~.) 
7 THE COURT: I will now go over briefly with you the 
8 right to request a Withdrawal of your guilty pl~~s.. 
~ ·o_rdina~ly ia~r a person plea~~ g~ilty ~ut lat,(~~si~$ to· 
1.Q withdraw his guilty pfea._ he mus( file .a. \\fiitt~~-tjlotion to 
1 t withdraw the pl~a before sentence is.~nQunced. A guilty 
12 plea may only be withdravm with_permlss,o0.from. the Co~rt ~nd 
13 only then by a showing that the plea:was not:knowingly and 
·14 voluntarily made, In other wo'rds~:such a motion'may'be 
15 denied~ Do you unQerstand this?· 
16 THE DEFENDANT:· Yest sit 
17 . THE CdtJRT; ·vp·to thi~ polo~ Mr. Rettij, is there 
18 anything that you do. nc,t understand ~bQut 'this p~ding or 
19 about the pleas that you will be entering 'in this case? · 
20 Tt,fE DEFENOAN"f;. No,. sir. 
21 ~E COURT; 1$ there·a~ythirigffu~t,yo~ W.OUkJ Jike 
~2 to ask me or your attorneys before I accept your pl~a 'to 
23 aggravated murd~r? 
24 THE DEFENDANT:- ,No, $it 
25 THE COURT: I'm· going to ask-the prosecutor to tell 
1 you and me what happened in this case •. I understand that 
2 tttat is $[ready (f~umented on'the statement in frontofyou, 
-3 a.nd y~tNe .had, .a: chan~to rev~w tb~t ~:d ~d Jii~t buJ 
4 i.ill ask .him t.o: ~tate·:that .for the ~urt' r.eqo_rct ·1 warit yo~ . 
5 to llste.n ~refuhy' be~_use;1Nhen ',the pr,os~~or Js thrQµgh 
6 rm going fo as~ you if eveiyth1ngJhathe said is .true. If · 
7 there's anythlng·the prosecutor says that you believe Is not 
8 .tru~l or accuratei-1 will,want you to. tell m~ ·about that, 9 okay? · · · · · · , · · · 
.-10 THEQEfENDA~J::, Qlcay~ 
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-:1J THE COURT: Mr~_Taylor~ . 
12 MR. TAYLOR: Judge, on:.or about November 1 ath, 
13 2009, Martin Bond and Benjamin Rettig traveled in Bond's 
-14 vehicle from Vernal, Utah, to Kay Mortensen's homeJn Spanish 
·1§ .Fo«-Utah.· The purpose in ~veling·to'Mortensen's home was 
16 to. stE)ai fire~nns loca~d in Mortens~-n's home. UP9il .arriving 
17· at l\tlortensen's home, Bond in~icate~. ~.e)v~~Jlp J~iq~tiy ~ie[ 
1 s· the home and then Rettig was to foJ_klw.him a·nd also enter ll)e 
1 ~:· home. . _ . . , .. _ _ _ . . . . .. .. · . 
20 . . . B.on.d .. and R~ttig eQter~d. the.home.without being 
21 .invited ancHiad.a handgunwith them .. ·e9.nd piaoecfzip'ti~~ p_n 
22- Mortensen. and both of them were· wearing ski·masks· and.latex 
23 gloves in order tg bidt3 their Identities. They. commanded 
24. M9rtenseri to :show trern where his fire~nni~JV~r~Jo_~~~ 
25 .. Mortensen toqk them to a.bunker fo~ted ~eh.in~:~1s h9~e. ~nd 
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· 1 they observed several weapo.ns~. The.y took Mortensen from the 1 said a.Jrue·and a~rjlte ciescrtp~on ~f wllat occu~ irfthis -
-2 . tiurikerand·Jiacldntohis home. 2 ~se'l · · · · ·· ·· · · · 
3 •: ·.. . ,. )Jt~i,~ntarijjg ~e,hop,~, _ihey:to9~ M,orl_ens~iJ . .. . 3 tHE D.EFENDANT; Yes, sir. 
:4 ~pstairs tq_fJ<baltlr®.m~J~pndJold Mortensen to.kneel ~own Jn 4 _ lliE _tj:)tJrfy;· ·vou. have atra.a~y ~igned· lh~t dqcur.neri~ 
':5 · front of th~. bathtu.b W{~h hfs 6a~ toJhern. While M9rtensen . 5 the statement of events? . 
6 wasJmeefingdown,Rettigwas holding Mortensen~tgunpoint. 6 MR: ·ESPLIN:: ·Hehas,VourHonor. For the record 
7 · with Bond's handgun. Band withdrevi a knife from his person . 7 let me ask!· is that your sigt1ature? 
8 andpl~ce~ thEfknifffbacJ< into hispQ~et · At this point 8 THE.DEFENDANT:.: Yes, sir. 
9 BOnd left the. bathfoom~: went downstairs and returned with a 9 M~ E~~Lltl;: :May_l appro~ch~ Yoµr Ho.~or.~ 
1Q bla~~~ild.ledknife ~ppfoximate1y· 10·1012 inches in length. 19 TtfE cp:µRT: 'Ye(~arikypu_~:· i hear'.choµrattorney 
11 . , Upqn returning, Rettig observed Bond ra.ke the knife '1f ask yop thi~~ :a~d' l h~ve a do~ument in f{pnt Qf me. On 
12 and slice Mortensen's throat It is not certain how many 1~ pagej~ated June 1_st,,which]syes_terd~y,:201f..there•s a 
13 times Bond cut Mortensen's throat After cutting hts throat 13 signature above the-inscription defendanfiooks like a Ben 
14 · he observed Bond stabMortensen· ir{the base of his neck with 14· Rettig. 1s th~t your sJgnature there? 
15 thesiinieknlfe .. · ..... · · ....... , . 15 . . n,u~=oEFJ:~DANT: YesjiJ\ 
16 · .. Shorlly atter_Bqnd cut and ·stabbed Mortensen, lh~y · 16 IBE C.Clt)BT: Mr.. Rettig, dcfyo_tif~I fha! iOs in 
17 heard sorn.eo~e _kn~c~·o~ the front door. Rettig ran . rt your best lnterestto.ent~r a guilty plea in this ~se on 
18 downstairs, hid behind the front door and Bond openeifthe 18 these.two cot1nts rather than go to triai? 
19 · door.•. A female and male were at the door asking for 19 THE DEFENDANT: ·1 do. 
2Q MQtt~sen~ _ ThtW later discovered these individuals were 2() THE CQURT: -:y o.u ~ave previously' entered pleas of 
21 Pamela arid Roger Moriens~n. Rettig was still holding the gun 21 -~ot gullty-iplea of not guilty to ·the offe.~se of 
22 when Pamela. and Roger entered the home. They jnfo~~ Pa. ela ·aggravated murder and a pie~ of not guilty to ~e offen~e of 
23 and Roger- that Mortensen was upstairs - e;xcuse me. Rettig 2~, agg~~cf kidnapping~ I'm. sorry, yoµ have nol What piea 
24. informed Pamela and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs and 24 d9 rou nQW enter to Count 1 of the 'information c,uninai 
25· that he was okay. They told Pam and Roger to walk into the 25 homicide, aggravated mutder. a noncapital first-degree 
30 
: 1 .s'i.frikeri living ·room~.and they placed zip ties on Pamela ·and 1 felony? 
2 Rogers hands a'.ricifeet . . . . 2 THEQEFf:NDANT:- Guilty •. 
32 
3 . At some: pofn't' Bond came :oufo(ttie kitchen With 3 THE.'.CQlJRJ: rn go coi.i~t by: couril Ba~ed on 
4 ~noUler knffe which ·Rettig bel1ev~d he.was goirtgJ9_ u~ tci· 4 Mr. _Refi!g's ,answers Jo the questions posed to h_im. the Court 
5 k.Ur Par.nera :~nf Roger •. Rettig stepped in front of Bond and 5 finds that he'_has Jead, signed. and f'ully understands the 
6 iotd him notlo kill them~ While Pamefa·and ·Roger w~re tied 6 ~ntents of.the plea_-statemenl · Based.upon the plea 
-7 Ojiirt the living room·, Rettig remained in the living room 7 statement and the 'Court's discussions with and observations 
:8 :with them holding the handgun while Bon~ ,removed a of Mt: Rettig, the court finds that he has entered a pfea ·of 
~-. ~ppr,o~ima~ely 25 o(Mprteil~~n~s ·weaponsl iocl~d'ing han~guns 9 g:uilt;d<>_:~ggfava't~d)nurdef_ kribw~ngly ~nd voluntarily and 
10· and mtes,-from the bunk~r and placed them in Bond's 10 witnJulf knowtedge of his _rights. the Court aiso finds that 
H ve~jcte. They also - Rettig a1$o helped tak~ some 11 Mr. Re~g und~tands the nature· _and elements of the offense 
12 ammunition from the. bunker and pface it in Bond's vehicle. 1z: Qf aggravated m.urdetand ·tne·relationship between the facts 
13 After the.y placed the guns and ammunition in Bondis :13 iil this case and the efemenis· of that offense. 
14 vehicte, they took Rqger Mortensen1s drivefs licen·se and 14 FiriaUy, the Court finds that the State's proffered 
1 s · told :him arid PamJhat' they needed to tell the police that- 15 evidence, ifbelfeved,'ls sufficient to· form a factual basis· 
16:· thraeblacfcmeifhaa tied them up. and if they told the police 16 for M~~ Rettig'sj.>lea of SU.illy. Based upon the foregoing, 
17° a diffe~n(story they knew where they lived, and they would 1·7 ~e Court accepts-the deferid~nfs pfea of guilty to 
18 come back ·and kill them. 18 aggravated mutd~r. 
1 Q · Tuey left .Mortens.en's residenceJ drove _back tp 1 ~- Mr. Rettig, what piea do you ·now enter to· Cot1nt 2 
20, Vernal. On the way back to Vernal, they stoppedat a rest. . 20_ Qf\he Information. ·aggravated kidnapping which relates.to 
21 stop and discarded some gloves in a dumpster. In Vernal Bond 21' Roger and Parriera Mortensen, a first-degree felony? 
22 andRettigwent up the canyon and buried the weapons. 22 THE:DEFENDANT;· Guilty. 
23 Following _this~ Bon~ took the hoodie and shoes from Rettig in ~3 , . .. THE CO_lJRT: Ba$ed upon Mr: Rettig's ansWer.s to the 
i4 prefer to dispose ·of _them. 24 :q~stio~s· pos~tf f() hUTJ. the plea .s~t~rn~nt ~nd the Court's . 
~5; THE COURT: Mr~ Rettig, is what the prpseg~torJu~~ :2s: dJ~cussionswith and ob$ervations of Mr. Rettig, the Court . 
~y BSTH ~OOK, :c~t aPif '(435). 8-68..;1075 
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-1 finds 1hathe fu1ly. under:stand~ the contents of the ptea , THE DEFENDANl} No. sir. . 
i · statement ·and that he has entered his plea .of"guHty' to . . . .. · 2 THE COURT:· rs::fhere anything· else tirau have 
3 aggravated kidnapping knowingly and voluntarily and with tun · 3 omitted or need to handle today; Mr. Esplin? 
4. knowledge of his rig~ts! Jhe ~ourta1$<ffmdt1 ~at· 4 MR. ESPLIN: Nq1You.rHonQt 
5. Mr. ijettig understands the nature ·and elements cif the.offeos.~ . 5 THE COURT:· Anything .~ls~'.(..ne~ fo doJoday, 
6 of aggravated kidnapping a~d .. Ul~. ~lationship be~~rr ti'.¥ . _6 ~~- Taylor? 
7 facts in this case 3Dd the efements of thai offense. . . . . 7 MR. TAYLOR: No, Judg~.- thank y<:>ll. . 
· 8 Finally,· the Court finds that ttie State•s pro~red 8 THE COURT: rd ·IJke·to thank ·tt,re:attomeysfo.r 
9 evidence, if believed,. is sufficient to form a factuar basts 9 their hard work in this case. I know· this.is Just the ~P-of 
10 · for Mr .. Rettig's ptea of guilty. · Bas~ upon the _foregoing, 1 o the. iceberg ·what we'v~ see~ an~ d,otj$.. ~~rt! tog~y and·tttat inany 
11 the Cowt ~c~p\s the defendant's plea of guilty to 11 hqurs have been spe_nt previo~s to· this. ··res "a-"weJghiy ~se· . . 
12 aggrayated kidnappiog. 12 for all involved. If~ a weighty case f~the_yictims aod:a 
13 . . Does the State have a motion-regarding Counts 3 an 13 weighty case for you as wen, Mr. 'Rettig. TJlank ·you, 
14 4? 14 Mr. Esplin and Mr. Frazier and, thank you, Mr •. Taylor and 
15 MR TAYLOR: State moves·to dismiss those counts, 15 Mr. Nielsen~ We'll be in recess. · 
1_8 . J.W9e.~ · · . . . . . . ·· . . _1$. (Whereupon, ih~ pro~edingifr.oricloded at 
17 .. .. . TH~COt)Ri: There's-no obj~ctiori I assume to that, 1! 9:52 a.m.} . . . . . ... 
18 fv1r.· E~pli11f . . . . . . . . . . 1 ~ 1~, . MR. ESP.Ut--l: Yes. 'we have agreed that the State 19 
20 ·wul proVide an Amended Information. . 20 
21 . MR TAYLOR: We'll file an Amended.Information 21 
:22 · Qn~u~ibfe }~ 22, 
23° ·· · ·· THE couRr:. The court will dismiss Counts 3 and 4 23 
.24 on the moµon of the_.$fate. and anticipate the filing ofan . 24° 
25 Amended ln(ormation in this case. 25 
34 36 
1 Mr. ReUlg; pursuant to Ruie 22 of the Utah Rules·: · 1 TRANsCRiBERis CERTIFICATE. 
2 of Criminal .Procedure~ the Court must set a time for' 2 
3_ _ ST~T.E 9f UTAl'.f ) 3 senten~i~g which can:nol .be less: thariMo days OQ( more than 
4 45 days after. the entry of the pleas. ~nless the Court,· with . . . 
5 your ~ncurrence; orders ·otherwis~. 
COUNTY.OF i~~ l 4 ~ 
6 What.is th:e party's reque$t? 
7 MR. ESPLIN: We'd iequesfihe matter be set r 
B believe it's on thtngth ·of Juty, Your Honor, which js 
-.~. a~tually tw~ days,. rthmk, past the 45 days. :TIWdefendant 
10 will waive the time (inaUdible) two days. 
11 THE COURT:.- _Is that yotir desir~. Mr. Rettig, to 
12 waive.your.rfghtto be senten~ in fess than 45d~ys? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir., .. 
14 · THE COURT: We'll setsentencing then in ·this case 
15 ~ for July 19th at 2:30 p.mi 
16 - Mr •. Rettig, an a~e6t.fr~J11 MuJt pf9ba\i<>.n.and: 
ft Parole will be contacting you at the jail and lnt~~tewlng 
18 .you and providing you wil~.paperwork to.fill qutregarding 
19 your life ~nd ·your experiences and your criminal histQry ~nd 
20 -other it~m$~· We'll Qrder thatyou (;()_operate with hll'n ir1 
21 preparation of that presentence report. He'll arso be 
22 -compiling information from the State 'arid from the defense. and 
23 fron, tne_victims.in this-case to p(oVide -~-c<>inplete.sentence 
2it · ~oJhe Court for senlen~ing on ~uly 19th~ 
25 · · Do ,you have any-quesUoJJs about th~t pr.,~,~? 
· ~- I, MARY BETH COOl(A°CERTIFIEDCOURTTJWJSCRIBEf 
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. 9 DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORUTAH COUNTY, STATE-OF UTA 
tO THAT THE FOREGOING. PAqES REPRESENT THE CC G., 
1.1.. TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE 81:ST OF MY AE 
1t WERE fiE(D ON THURSOAY, JUNE 2,201 tAND THAT·SAIDTF 
13 CONTAINS ALL OF THE AUDIB_LE TESTIMONY; o:aJECTIONS 0 
14 AND RULINGS-OF THE COURT. . 
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